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The Cont ra ct for Deed as a Mortgage: The Case
for  the  Restatem ent  Approach
Grant  S . Nelson*
I. IN T R O D U C T I O N
My int ere st  in t he cont ra ct for deed  goes back  to ea rly child -
hood in  Min nes ota . I ca n  rem em ber  as a  chi ld  of six or seven
list enin g to my  pa ren t s  bemoan  the fact  t h a t  t hey were pur-
chas ing the ir  fi r st  home on  such  a  con t r a ct. Th ey envied  th eir
neighbors, most  of whom wer e “lucky” enou gh t o be finan cing
th eir  house purchases with mortgages. My pa ren ts  wer e un able
to come up  with a  large enough down payment  for a  conven-
t iona l mor tga ge.  Nor  did m y fa ther  qu a lify  for  a  “no-down-pay-
men t” loan gua ra nt eed by the Vet erans  Admin ist ra t ion .  In -
stead, the seller agreed to t a k e  ba ck  a  con t ract  for  deed.  Why
were  th ey so a ppr eh en sive a b ou t  doing t his ? Why did t hey fin d
a  mor tga ge com pa ra t ive ly s o app ea lin g? Wh ile  I cle a r ly d id  not
unders tand th e deta ils, I can  rem ember  m y mot he r t ellin g me
tha t  if th ey ever  ha d t rou ble m ak ing t he  pa yme nt s, t he y would
lose th e hou se fas ter  with  a  con t ract  for  deed than with  a  mor t -
gage. A few years lat er  my p ar en ts  wer e clear ly ha ppy a nd
relieved when  a somewh at  lower cont ra ct balan ce and m ar ket
ap pr eciat ion ena bled t hem  to r efina nce t he h ouse w ith  a  tra di-
t iona l m or tga ge.  I n ext  rem em ber  confront in g t he con t ract  for
deed in  Profes sor  Ter ry Sanda low’s secon d yea r  la w s chool
course  in  Rea l E st a te Transa ct ion s a nd b ein g bot h  i n tr i gued
and confused by wh eth er it s hould be govern ed by i t s con t ract
l anguage form or  i t s mor tgage finan cing substance. Little did I
know th en t ha t wit hin  a few yea rs  it wou ld a ssu me a  ma jor role
in  my profes siona l ca reer  as a  la wye r  and a cade mic.1
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2. RE S T AT E M E N T (THIRD ) O F  P ROPERTY : MO R TG A GE S  § 3.4 (a) (1 997 ).
For  most of this cent ur y, the con t r a ct  for deed h as been  th e
most pe rva sively u se d s ubs t it u te for  the m or tga ge or  de ed  of
t rus t . F ir st , some t er min ology i s impor tan t . De pe nding on  the
ju r isdict ion , this finan cing device is also called an “in s t allment
land con t ract , ” an  “insta l lment  sa le con t r act , ” a  “bond for deed”
or  a  “long-te rm land  con t ract . ” A con t ract  for  deed i s not  an
“earnest  mon ey contr act ” or a  “bind er.” The la tt er d evice is
simp ly an executory contract for th e sale of land an d  d oe s  n ot
ser ve a  mor tgage  funct ion ; ra t h e r , it  governs the rights and
obliga t ion s of t he  pa r t ie s du r ing  the shor t  per iod  be tween  the
t ime of its sign ing a nd t he closing of t he t r ansa ct ion . At  the
closing, a deed is delivered  to t he p ur cha ser  who u su ally
executes  an d delivers  a  p u rchase money mor tgage  to an
ins t itu t iona l lend er  or, in  some  sit ua tion s, t o th e vendor.
Indeed, i t  is  usua lly a t  th is  s t a ge  t h at a  contr act  for deed is
executed to serve as a  su bs t it u te for  a  mor tga ge t o the ve ndor .
Whi le a p recise  definit ion of the cont ra ct for deed  is elu sive, it
is perhaps app ropr ia tely  de scr ibe d a s “a  cont ract  for  the
purchase and  sa le  of rea l e sta te  under  which  t he pur chaser
acquires  the  immedia te r igh t  to pos se ss ion  . . . a nd t he ve ndor
defe r s delivery of a deed u nt il a later  time t o secur e a ll or part
of t he  pu rchase p r ice .”2
From an  economic per spe ctive, th e  con t ract  for  deed thus
serves  the same pur pose as a  vendor pu rcha se money m ortgage.
Bot h  devices provide securit y for a  seller of rea l esta te who
finances  a ll or  a  pa r t  of the p urchase  pr ice.  In  a  typ ica l con t ract
for  deed tr an saction, th e vendee ta kes possession an d ma kes
month ly p a ym en ts of p r in cipa l a nd in ter es t  on  the con t ract
obliga t ion  until the contr act is paid off. This a m or t iza t ion
per iod m a y  va r y from a few years t o twent y years or m ore. The
ven dor  conveys lega l t it le t o the vendee only a fter  th e full
con t ract  obligation has been  sa t is fied . Du r in g t h is  cont ract
period, the ve nde e is  requ ir ed  to pe r form the n ormal obl iga t ion s
ass ociated  with  being a  mor tga gor in p ossess ion. The se in clude
payment of re a l es ta te t axes , m ain ten ance of casu a l ty
ins ur an ce, an d ke epin g th e pr opert y in good rep air .
Vendors ha ve tr ad ition ally favor ed cont ra cts for deed over
purchase money mort gages or deeds of t rus t . Why th i s
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3. S ee RE A L E S T AT E  F I N AN C E  LAW , supra note 1,  §§ 3.4-.19; R E S T AT E M E N T,
supra  note 2, §§ 3.2-.3.
prefe rence for  a  non t rad it iona l  fina n cing device when it ser ves
the same economic fun ction a s it s well-es ta blish ed m ort gage
coun te rpa r t ? The  an swer  lies in  th e forfeitu re cla use found in
vir tua l ly every cont ra ct for deed. Th is langu age ma kes “t i m e of
the esse nce” and  pr ovides t ha t wh en a  pu rch as er fa ils to comply
with  th e ter ms of the contr act, th e vendor ha s th e opt ion to
de cla re it  t er min a ted , t o ret ake p oss es sion  of the premises, and
to r e t a in  the  pu rchaser ’s pr ior payments as liquidated damages.
To the  ex ten t  tha t  the  for fe itu re p r ov ision is  effective, t he
con t ract  for deed en able s t he vendor to avoid th e pur chaser ’s
equ i ty of re de mpt ion , t he for e closure pr ocess, an d other
t radit iona l pr otect ion s a fforde d t o de bt ors u nde r  the la w of
mortgages.
This  a t t empt  to a v oid t he cons equ ences  of mortga ge law is
har dly un iqu e in  our  lega l h is tory. F or  example, l en de rs for
cen tu r ie s have used as a  se cur it y devi ce a n  abs olu te d eed fr om
the bor rower  to the  lender  tha t  con ta ins no defeasance
language. This deed is accompan ied by an oral or written side
agreem ent  by wh ich t he  lend er -gra nt ee a gre es t o reconvey t he
p r oper ty to the bor rower  if t he d ebt  is  sa t is fied . If,  on  the ot h er
han d, t he  bor rower  fails  to pay as  promised, t he pa rt ies agree
tha t  the deed becomes a bsolut e, an d t he b orr ower’s in ter est  in
the lan d is t erm ina ted . Un der  th e “condit iona l s a le” var i an t  on
the  absolu te deed tr an saction, th e deed ma y be accompan ied by
a  second wr itten  docum ent  which pu rport s to give the
bor rower -g ran tor  eit her  the op t ion  or  cont ractua l obl iga t ion  to
purchase th e re al es ta te d escrib ed in  th e ab solut e de ed . Cou r t s
have lon g been unsympath etic to these two att empts to
circumvent  the  law of mor tga ges . In de ed , t hey h ave long
perm itted  the  gran tor  in  each case to e st ab li sh  by pa rol
evide nce th at  th e pa rt ies int ended a security tra nsaction and,
where th i s burden  is  sa tisfied,  t r ea ted the  a r rangement  as  a
mort gage.3
 Th e con t ract  for  de ed  did n ot  in it ia lly confront  such  judicia l
disa ppr oval. Indeed, at one tim e its forfeitur e provision was
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4. S ee Er ic T. Fr eyfogle, Vaguen e ss  and  the  Ru le  of  Law: Reconsider ing
Ins ta l lmen t La nd  Con tr act  Forf eitu res , 1988 DUKE  L.J . 609, 610. According to
Freyfogle:
Decades  a go the law was r elatively clear. Court s enforced forfeiture clauses
with  few questions asked, except perhaps  wh en  a  fo r fe itu re  was  shocking
in  amoun t o r  otherwise g rossly u nfair . A vendor wit h a n en forceable
forfeitur e clau se cou ld declare a default a nd forfeiture when a  purcha ser
missed  a p aym en t. Aft er  th e de clar at ion,  th e ve nd or cou ld recover his
p rope r ty and reta in all of the purchaser’s payments.
Id . (cit at ion s om it te d).
5. RE S T AT E M E N T, supra  no te 2 , §  3.4 cmt . a .
6. Bra un stein  v. T ro tt ier , 63 5 P .2d  137 9, 1 382  (Or . Ct . App . 19 81).
7. S ee REAL E S T AT E  F I N AN C E  LAW , supra note 1, § 3.1.
rout inely enfor ced by m an y ju r isdictions.4 Th is  apparen t
favorit ism  for  t he  con t r act  for  deed has been described as follows:
E n for ce m e n t pr es u m a bly  wa s r oot ed  in  a  de sir e t o effe c t u a t e
t h e  p a r t i e s ’ i n t en t ,  even  though  fo r fe itu r e  o ft en  cau sed  a
s u b st a n t ia l l os s  t o th e pu rch as er  an d a fforde d a  win dfa ll gain
t o t h e ven dor.  .  .  .  Never th eless,  court s  ten ded  to de-em ph asize
t h e m ort ga ge-like  c h a r a ct e r  of t h e  co n t r a ct  fo r  d ee d  a n d  t o
tr ea t it  ins te ad  as  an  execu tor y cont ra ct for t he  sa le of lan d. 5
Why was t his t he ca s e? Aft er a ll, as on e re cent  decision
emphasized, “[i ]f [t he  absolu te  deed ] k ind  of for fe it u r e  may not
be en forced by the  [g ran tee] a ccording t o the expres s t er ms of
the agreement, why, then, should a forfeitur e un der  a  [con t ract
for  deed] be so enforced?”6 The re a re a t lea st  th ree  pla us ible
reasons for  t h is  d ispa ra t e  t r ea tmen t . F ir s t , i n th e absolut e deed
and condit iona l sa le set tin g, th e len der  enga ges in  a  form of
su bte rfu ge. Cour ts  ma y be int uit ively host ile t o a t t empt s  t o use
the l a n gua ge of sale t o concea l a s ecur ity t ra ns act ion. With  th e
contr act for deed, on  th e other  ha nd, t he secur ity int ent  is clear
from the fa ce of t he documen t . So,  too, i s the  in ten t  to avoid the
consequ ences of mor tga ge l aw. P er haps , t o som e ir onic degree,
the t endency to enforce  the contr act  for deed r eflected a  judicia l
r eward for  candor .  One  prob lem wi th  th is  la t t e r  a rgument, of
course, is that t rut hfulness never  work ed in  st an da rd  mor tga ge
se t t ings, wher e a tt em pt s t o ha ve th e m ort gagor  open ly wa ive
h i s or  her  equ it y of r ed em pt ion  were u n i formly re jected  as
inva lid “clogs” on th at  equ ity. 7
A second  and more lik ely  rea son  for  th is  judicia l a ccep tance
of the contr act for deed and its forfeitur e provision  is h i stor ica l .
The contr act for deed was a  p r oduct  of the  second  ha lf of the
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8. S ee Sidn ey P. S imps on, Legislative Changes in th e Law of Equ itable
Con vers ion  by Contract: II , 44 YALE  L.J . 75 4, 7 76 (1 935 ) (“The  doct r ine tha t  equ i ty
will enforce forfeiture pr ovisions  in l an d con tr act s wh er e t im e is  exp re ssl y m ad e of
the essence developed in t his  coun t ry  du r ing the  la t t e r  ha lf  of  the  n ine t een th  cen tu ry,
a t  a t im e whe n e xt re me  ide as  as  to ‘fre ed om  of con tr act ’ were  in flu e n ci n g Ame ri can
judicial  de cisi on s in  eve ry  fiel d.”) (cit at ion s om it te d).
9. S ee Roscoe Pou nd, The Decadence of Equity, 5 CO L U M. L. RE V. 20 (1 905 ).
10. Simpson,  supra  note 8, at 776. As Professor Simpson described this period:
[T]h e cla ss ica l ch an cellor  wh o cre at ed t he  equ it y of r ede mp ti on i n t he  face
of the st rict law and wh o said that  “necess it o u s m e n  ar e not  . . . free m en,”
had give n p lace  to ju dge s wh o re gar ded  ind ivid ua l fre edom  of cont r a ct  as
fundamenta l i n  an y civilize d sy st em  of law  an d en force d t he  ha rs he st  of
cont rac t provision s without hesitation or searching of conscience unless
cons t r a ined by binding precedent to relieve against  them . Th e cour t  o f
cons cien ce h ad become a  court  str ictissim i juris . In su ch an  at mosph ere, it
was easy enough to put aside  t he tr adition tha t equity would not enforce a
forfeitur e except in so far as tha t tra dition had been en ba lm ed i n d ir ect
precedents, and to dev e lo p a  line  of decis ions  hold ing  th at  cont ra cts  for t he
sale  of land which expressly made time of the essence and provided for  t he
forfeitur e of all payments  ther etofore made in  the even t of default would be
enfor c ed according to th eir literal ter ms, especially where prompt pa yment
of all  ins ta llm en ts  wa s m ad e a n e xpr ess  “condit ion p re cede nt ” to th e
purchase r ’s r i gh t s  under  t he  con t r ac t .
Id . a t  777 (citations omitt ed). For examples of early cases reflecting this perspective,
see Heckard v. Sayre , 34 I ll. 14 2 (186 4); Iowa  R .R . Land  Co. v . Micke l, 41 Iowa 402
(187 5); Br own  v. U lri ch , 67  N. W. 1 68 (N eb.  189 6).
11. S ee RE A L E S T AT E  F I N AN C E  LAW , supra note 1, at  491.
n ine teen th centu ry, a per iod when a  “freed om -of-cont ract”
per spe ctive an d its r elated  laissez faire economic ph ilos oph y
were  making a su bsta nt ial impa ct on American jur ispru dence.8
Not  only wer e court s less  pr one t o invoke equitable  discr et ion
dur ing this period,9 th ey gener ally though t “in term s of free-
willing individuals en tirely a ble to look aft er t hem selves ra th er
than  in t e rms either  of clas sical equ ity or of a s ocialized law
t ak ing a  rea lis t ic a ccount  of in equa lit ies  of econ omic posi t ion
an d ba rga inin g power .”10
 F in a lly , a nd e qu a lly  im por tan t , t he con t ract  for deed
originat ed before t he d eve lopmen t  and w ide-s pr ea d a dop t ion  of
power of sa le foreclosure an d similar nonjudicial counterpart s.
J ud icial foreclosur e, th e only r em edy t he n  a v ailable to
mortgagees, req uir ed a  full court  pr oceeding wit h  the  joinde r  of
a l l interested junior interest s  a n d  wa s, and  still is, both tim e-
consuming an d costly. 11 In  a ll l ik eli hood,  wh en  the con t ract  for
deed came on t he scene it w as a ccept e d a s  a n innovat ive and
efficient  new lan d finan cing technique.
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12. RE S T AT E M E N T, supra  no te  2, § 3 .4(b ).
This  Art icle, however , ta kes  th e posit ion th at , wha teve r it s
valu e h is t or ically, th e contr act  for deed h as  no pla ce in a
modern  lan d fina ncin g system. In so doing, this Article is a
brief for  the p osi t ion  of th e Restatem ent (Th ird) of Property
(Mortgages) th at  “[a] contr act  for deed  crea te s a  mor tga ge.”12
This  Art icle  wil l fir st  exp lor e th e myriad a ppr oaches
con tempora ry cour t s  app ly  to t he contr act  for deed. Th is
examina t ion  wil l demons t r a t e t ha t  while th ey have reached no
ana lyt i ca l or practical consensus, courts and legislat ur es h ave
incr eas ingly been  focusin g on  this  device wit h a  mor tga ge law
ana logy in  min d.  Th is  Art icle  then  wil l explore t he cor e id ea  of
the R estat em en t  approach and its potential impact on these
issu es. Next, th is Article will explore h ow the contr act for deed
ra ises a var iety of a dd it ion a l im por tan t  pr oble ms a nd h ow
ad option  of th e R estat em ent approach will  resolve them. These
difficult  i ssues  include  the followin g: title pr oblems an d rela ted
pract i ca l difficulties created by the  con t ract  for  deed; the
“executory contract” problem in bankru ptcy; the rights of
judgment creditors of contr act for deed pa rt ies; and  the complex
prob lems confront ing secur ed len der s in  ad van cing cred it t o
con t ract  vend ors or  pu rch as ers . Fin ally, t he Ar ticle will
demons t r a t e that  continued use  of the contract for deed is
sim ply un necessar y because t h e  ve n dors’ need for a sa fe,
efficient , an d t imely m echa nis m for d ealin g with  delinquen t
purchaser s can  be sa tis fied wit hin  th e confines  of mort gage  law.
Indeed, th e expa nd ing st at e ad option of power  of sale
foreclos ure in crea singly obvia tes  cont in ued  reli ance on  the
con t ract  for deed. At  most , th e Art icle wil l con clu de , some sligh t
modificat ion of power  of sa le  st a tu tes may be necessa ry to make
foreclos ure more  t imely  and e ffi cien t  aga i ns t  purchasers  who
have p a id  only a  sm all p er cen tage of t he m or tga ge ob liga t ion .
II. TH E  F O R F E IT U RE  CO N C E P T
 As noted  above, th e ra is on  d’etre—the  hear t  and soul—of
the con t ract  for  de ed  is  the for fei tu re p rovision . Yet
su rp ris ingly,  th ere is n o clear  consensus  for  i t s under lying
ra tionale.  Profes sor  Freyfog le i de n t ifie s t wo con t radictory
bases, the “forfeitur e as rescission” and “for fe itu re  as con t ract
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13. S ee Er ic T. F reyfogle, Installment Land Contracts, i n  15 RICHARD R. P OWELL
ON  REAL P ROPERTY  § 84D .03 [2], 8 4D. 31 (1 997 ).
14. Id .
15. Id .
16. S ee Fr eyfogle, supra  note 4, at  638-39.
17. S ee id .
18. S ee, e.g., MI N N . STAT . AN N . § 507 , N o. 54 -M (We st  199 0).
t e rmina t ion” th eories.13 Under  the  resci ss ion  approach ,  in  the
eve nt  of de fau lt , t he ve ndor  and  pu rchaser  a r e  re stored to th eir
pos it ions pr ior t o th e execu tion  of the  contr act . As Professor
Freyfogle explains,
[t] h e  ven dor  is en tit led t o th e pr oper ty b ack  in it s or igin al
con d i t ion . He n eed n ot  shou lder  t he loss  i f  the p roper ty h as
dec li n e d  i n  va l u e, b u t  h e ca n n o t r e a p  t h e  ga i n  of a n y  in cr e a se .
T h e pu r chase r  i s  en t i t l ed  to  the  r e t u rn  o f a l l p a y m e n t s  a n d  t o
t h e va l u e  o f any  im provemen t s  m ade  to  th e  p rope r ty .  Because
t h e p u r ch a s e r  e n jo ye d  t h e  u s e o f t h e  p r op e r t y  du r i n g  t h e
con t r a ct  pe ri od, t h e p u rch a s er  m u s t  r et u r n  t h is  be n efit  t o t h e
v e n d or . A s i t ca n n o t b e r e t u r n ed  in  k in d , t h e  pu r ch a se r
i n st e a d is ob liga te d t o pa y r en t. . .  . [T]h e ve n dor  i s  no t  en t i t l ed
t o th e b en efit  of h is  con t r a ctu al  ba rg ai n , if an y, sin ce t h e goa l
is  t o  pu t  th e pa r t ies  in  th eir  pr e-cont ra ct  posi t ions.  By th e
s a m e  t ok e n , t h e p u r ch a s e r  is  a lso u n a ble  to cla im  a n y con tr a ct
ba rga in  bene f i t s .14
Under  the forfeitu re  as con t ract  t er min a t ion  theor y, t he ve ndor
ter mina tes t he contr act, but  it is not “unwoun d.” Rat her ,
 t h e  v e n d or  i s a b s ol ve d  of t h e  du ty of fu t u r e p e rfor m a n ce  un de r
t h e con t r ac t—de l ive ry  o f t he  deed .  H e  a l so  r ega ins  the
prope rty,  sin ce t h e p u rch as er ’s r igh t t o pos se ss ion  i s  en t i r e ly
d e pe n d en t  u p o n  t h e  c on t i n u e d  e x i s t e n ce  o f t h e  c o n t r a c t .  T h e
ven dor  can r ightfu l ly  re t ain  th e pu rch as er ’s pa ym en ts , in t his
case  because  t hey  a r e  v i ewed  a s  l i qu ida ted  dam ages .15
P r ofessor Fr eyfogle obser ves t ha t t he t wo th eories  poten tia lly
provide usefu l a lt er na t ive s for  ass es sing t he fa ir nes s of
par t icu la r forfeitu res  an d a idin g cour ts  in calcu l a ting the
ven dor ’s dama ges and the p urchaser’s restitut ion rights.16
Professor  Freyfogle also notes, however, th at  cour ts r ar ely
distinguish between  the two approaches and  confuse e lements
of bot h .17 Neve rt he less , since con t ract  for  deed forms  rou t inely
use “forfeitu re as cont ra ct ter mina tion” lan guage, 18 it is  fair  to
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20. S ee, e.g., Hicks v. Dunn , 622 So. 2d 914 (Ala. 1993); Smith v. MRCC
Par tnersh ip, 792 So. 2d 301 (Ark. 1990); Grombone v. Krekel, 754 P.2d 777 (Colo. Ct.
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Hughes, 867 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Ct . App.  1993 ); Wilson  v. Wit t, 9 52 P .2d 2 14 (Wyo.
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21. S ee, e.g.,  Smith v. MRCC Partner ship, 792 So. 2d 301 (Ark. 1990) (upholding
forfeitur e after five-year default wher e purchaser h ad paid ap p r oxim at ely  10% o f th e
cont rac t pr ice); Gr omb one  v. Kr ek el, 7 54 P .2d 7 77 (Col o. Ct. App. 1988) (enforcing
forfeitur e where pu rchase r  de fau l t ed  r epea tedly and  where  equ ity  in  r ea l e s t a t e
equaled  approximately 10% of fair mark et value); Long v. Smi t h, 776  S.W. 2d 4 09 (Mo.
Ct . App. 1989) (appr oving forfeiture wher e purcha ser’s contract paym ents wer e
p ropor t iona te to th e re ason able r ent al va lue of th e pr emis es). 
22. 702 P. 2d  993  (N. M. 1 985 ).
say tha t  most  cour t s e nforcin g for feit u re p rovis ion s a re  more
a t tuned  to, a nd impl icit ly a ccep t in g of, t he la t t er  app roach .
What ever th e unde r lying r a t iona le , do modern  cour t s
gener ally enforce cont ra ct for deed  forfeitu re p rovisions  in t he
absence of specifi c s t a tu tory  au thor iza t ion? Accord ing  to one
commenta tor , “[n]ot  only d oes th e law  va ry from ju r isd ict ion  to
ju r isdict ion , but  wit hin  an y one  st a t e  r esu lt s  may vary
depending up on t he  typ e of action  br ough t, t h e exa ct  t er ms of
the l and con t ract ,  and the  fact s  of the  pa r t i cu lar ca se.”19 The
int erp lay of thes e lat t er  factors  make p red ict ions  concern ing
forfeitu re  espe cially proble mat ic. True, r ecen t  de cis ion s
somet i m es uphold forfeitures.20 However, ma ny of th ese cases
involve purchasers  who were  rep ea ted ly in  de fau lt  and w ho had
pa id a r elatively insu bsta nt ial proport ion of th e cont ra ct price.21
Moreover , in  some cases , the “p rofor fe itu re” r e su l t may be more
relat ed to the remedy sought  by  the purchaser  than to a  genera l
judicial endorsem ent  of th e forfeitur e concept.
The lat t er observa tion is clearly sup ported by  Ru ssell v.
R ichards,22 a  leading New Mexico Suprem e Court  decision. In
tha t  case the Richardses, as vendors and pur chaser s, execut ed
a  cont ra ct for deed for ap proximat ely $49,000. Sometime la ter ,
pu rchaser s sold an d a ssign ed t heir  int ere st  to Ru ssell, wh o paid
$11,188 to pu rchase rs in  cash  and a ss umed  a  $37,9 38 ba la nce
on the  con t ract .  Afte r  making seven ty-t wo mont hly paymen t s t o
the Richard ses, which r educed th e p r in cipa l of t he  con t r act  t o
$26,504, Russell defau lted a nd t he Richar dses invoked
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forfeitur e. By tha t  t ime  the r ea l e st a t e ha d increa sed in valu e to
$82,735. Ru ss ell  then  filed a n  act ion  for  d a mages  aga inst  the
Richard ses  for  da m ages  res ult ing from  th e defa ult . The t ria l
cour t  held  tha t  Ru ss ell ’s con t ract  i nt eres t wa s forfeited , but  it
also det e rmined  tha t  the for feit u re s hocked  the con scien ce of
the court . It en tered a  judgment for dam ages  in favor  of Russell
for  $56,724 , rep re sen tin g her  equ ity in  th e real est at e. On
appeal,  the Suprem e Court  of New Mexico reversed the
dam ages  awa rd.  It  held  tha t  the t r ia l cou r t  abused i t s
discret ion  in failin g to give full effect to t he forfeit ur e. While
the supr eme cou r t  det erm ined  th at  it wa s pr oper for t he t ria l
cour t  t o t ake in to account  Ru ss ell ’s r ed uct ion  of the con t ract
p r incipa l of $10,782 over six yea rs , it wa s in ap pr opria te t o
credit  her  with t he $11,188 down payment  she made to the
origina l pu rchasers when  she assumed  the con t ract .  In  the
supreme court ’s view, since t his  la t t er  pa ym en t  did n ot  go t o
the Rich ards es , it  could  not  count  as a  red uct ion  of cont ract
pr incipa l . Mor e im por tan t , a ccording t o the s upr em e cou r t ,  t he
t r i a l cou r t  a w ar d ed  d am a ge s a ga i ns t  p ar t ie s—t h e
Richard ses—who were not wr ongdoers:
W e  a ls o a g r e e  w i t h  t h e R i ch a r d s e s  t h a t  t h e tr ial cou rt  er re d in
a w a r din g dam ages  for  Russe l l ’s  lo s s  o f h e r  i n t e r es t  u n d e r  t h e
c on t r a c t . In  o rder  to  recover  dam ages  th ere  m us t  be  a  r ig h t of
act ion  fo r  a  w r on g  in f li ct e d  on  t h e  p a r t y  cla im in g  dam ages ;
d a m a g e wi thou t  wr ong  does  not con s t it u t e a  ca u s e of a ct ion .
Ru sse ll’s  l os s  of h e r  in t e r es t  u n d er  t h e  co n tr a ct  d id  n ot  r e su lt
from  a  wrong  comm i t t ed  by  the  R icha rdses ,  bu t  f rom h e r
d e fa u lt  u n d e r  t h e  r ea l es ta te  cont ra ct for  failu re  to m ak e
t ime ly  pa ym en t.  Th e u su a l con se qu en ce of d e fa u lt , a s  cl ea r l y
s t a t ed  in  the  con t r a c t  a s sum ed  by  Russe l l , i s  forfeit u r e  of a ll
i n t er e st ; on ly  unusu a l  equ i t ab le  c ir cum s tan ces  crea t e  an
excep t ion  to  tha t  ru l e .23
Does Ru ssell s t and  for  the  propos it ion  tha t  for fe itu re will be
enforced against  a  pur chaser  who ha s over a sixty-eight per cent
equ i ty in the  con t r act  r ea l e st a t e? Hard ly . Assume th a t  the
Richard ses  had  foreclosed the  con t ract  a s  a  mor tgage  and tha t
th ey pu rchased  a t  t he foreclosu re sa le for $26,504, the principal
amount  owing on  the  con t r act  obligation. Would Russell be
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ent itled to a judgment  again st t he Richar dses for over $56,000
(the app roxim ate d iffer en ce bet ween  the for eclos ure s a le p r ice
and the  fa i r  marke t  va lue of the lan d)? Sur ely not . No mor tgage
law  pr in cip le e nable s a  foreclosed  mor tgagor  to ob ta in  a
judgment aga ins t  a mor tgagee-purchaser  for  her  lost e qu ity. At
mos t , sh e would  ha ve th e ext r e mely  rem ote p oss ibi lit y of
hav ing th e sale set  aside becau se of a  gros s ly  inadequa te
price.24
On the other han d, suppose that  Russell,  as a tar dy
purchaser , had in stead b rought  an act ion  aga ins t  the
Richard ses  for  spe cific per formance  and,  in  so doing,  tende red
the ba lan ce of th e cont ra ct pr ice int o cour t. To u se a  mor tga ge
law  analogy, Russell,  a ta rdy mortgagor, would be filing suit  t o
redeem . Would the N ew Mexico Suprem e Court  ha ve denied
specific per formance  and,  in  so doing,  en forced the  for fe itu re
pr ovision under  such  ci r cumst a n ces?25 It  seem s ext rem ely
un likely.  In  the l a st  ana lys is , wha t doom ed Russe ll  was  the
ext re me  na tu re  of the  re me dy sh e sou ght .
III. STAT UT OR Y RE G U L A T I O N: IN S T I T U T I O N A LI Z IN G  F O R F E I T U R E
 S ev er a l st a tes  have a t t em pt ed  to ameli orat e some of t he
har shness  of cont ra ct  for  de ed  for feit u re t h rough  leg is la t ion .26
Most  such st at ut es ma nda te “grace periods ” dur ing  which  the
pur chaser  can  avoid  for feit u re by paym en t  of cont ract
arr earages.27 In  add it ion , t hey fr equen t ly p rovid e for
non judicia l procedures  by which th e vendor m ay ter m i na te  the
purchaser ’s contr act rights.28 Th e Iowa  st a tu te is  illust ra t ive  of
th i s appr oa ch .2 9  It pr ovides th at  cont ra cts for deed m ay be
cancelled only by following a specified procedure. Th e vendor
must  afford wr itten  notificat ion to the defau lting pu rcha ser a nd
to the per son  in  pos se ss ion  of t he real estate; the notice must
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iden tify the  r ea l  e st a t e, ide n t ify t he spe cific p rovis ion s of t he
con t ract  tha t  a re  in  defau l t , and  in form the  purchaser  tha t  he
or  she has th irt y da ys in w hich  to corre ct t he d efau lt.  Assuming
the pur chaser  complies  with in  th is tim e per iod, th e forfeitu re is
avoided. Absen t  compliance, th e notice of forfeiture, t ogether
with  p roof of service, may be recorded t o cons t it u t e  cons t ruct ive
not ice of t he  comple t ed  for fe itu re . As  a  r esu lt ,  t he  r ea l  e st a t e
and a ll p r ior  pa ym en ts a re for feit ed  to the ve ndor .30
These s t a tu t es  s erve two separat e and distinct functions.
The grace per iods clear ly temper  th e ha rsh ness  of forfeitur e.
On the oth er  ha nd, t hey also put  th e legislative impr imatur on
the forfeitu re concept . This  appr oach la rgely a voids th e
un cert ain ty concer nin g forfeit ur e th at  is eviden t in  many of th e
sta tes  th at  leave cont ra cts for deed en forceme n t  t o the
jud iciar y. Sim ply stat ed, su ch st at ut es t ell a ven dor: “Comp ly
with  th e sta tu te a nd forfeitur e is enforceable.” To be sure,
cour t s in  such st at es sometim es su ggest  tha t  judicia l r eli ef fr om
an “uncon sciona ble forfeitur e” ma y be available.31 Moreover ,
s t a tu tory forfeitu re h as  occas iona lly been d enie d in  cert ain
m i nor , nonm onet a r y defaul ts . 3 2  Never th eless , judicia l
int er ven tion  in s uch  st at ut ory pr oceedings  “t ends  to focus  more
on techn ica l  st a tu tory  compliance  and in terp re tat ion  than  on
an  ind epen den t a na lysis of th e fair ne ss of forfeitu re .”33
Sta tu tory complian ce also gen era lly pr oduces a  ma rk eta ble t itle
for  the ve ndor .34
IV. J U D I C I A L  LI M IT AT IO N S  O N T H E  F O R F E IT U RE  RE M E D Y
 Thus far, we ha ve seen th at  forfeitu re  re ceives, a t  bes t ,
limited  suppor t  in  st a tes  tha t  do not  regu la te con t r act s for deed
legisla tive ly. In  s t a tu tory  regu la t ion  stat es, on  the  other  hand,
forfeitu re  is ins t itu tion alized  an d r out inely a vaila ble, albe it
am eliora ted t o some degr ee. For  t he  mos t  par t , however , cou r t s
have increasin g ly refu sed t o enforce aga ins t a  defau ltin g
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pur chaser  for fe it u r e  cl a us es  t h a t  they have deeme d
un rea sona ble or  in equit able . Th es e cou r ts  h ave utilized a
variet y of techn ique s in  th is pr ocess. A growing nu mber  of
cour t s explicitly or implicitly recognize that  a tar dy purchaser
has th e functional equ ivalent  of a mortgagor’s equ it y of
red em pt ion .35 Wher e th is is  the  case,  cour t s  permi t  the
pur chaser  t o te n de r  the b ala nce of th e pu rch as e pr ice in a  su it
or  count ercla im for s pecific p er formance. T his  app roach ,
however, does not give the pu rchase r  wh o is  unwilling or
un able  to red eem the r igh t  to compe l for eclos ure of t he  con t r act .
Even  where  for fei t ur e  is u ph eld, cour ts  tem per  it by ext end ing
to the d e fau l t ing  purchaser  a  res ti tu ti on  remedy.36 This gives
t he purchaser  the  r igh t  to recoup  the con t ract  payments  t o t he
extent  that  they exceed the damages caused by the  pu rchaser ’s
defau lt . Fin ally, s ome cour ts  ha ve t a k e n  the ultimat e step of
sim ply t r ea t ing the  con t r act  for  deed as a  mort gage.37 Where
t h i s is t he ca se, t he p ur cha ser  ha s both  a m ort gagor’s equit y of
redem p t ion  and  th e righ t t o insist  th at  it be t erm ina ted  only
th rough foreclos ure. T his  app roach  is  adop ted by the
R estat em ent.38
Of cours e, th e foregoing p rocess has  ha rd ly been  tid y or
an alyt ically pleasing. Som e cou rt s simp ly have not considered
forfeitu re  in  a ll of t he a bove  rem ed ia l con text s a nd m any of
th eir  op in ions  a re fa r  from theore t ica l ly  precise. Cou r t s,  for
examp le, ma y gran t a  ta rdy pu rcha ser s pecific perfor m ance
and,  in doin g so, app ly only contr act  an alys is. The equ ity of
redemption is simply not mentioned. While many court s use an
almost pu re m or tga ge law a na lys is , ot her s employ a  confu sing
amalgam of con t ract  and  mor tgage law. Nevertheless, the  t r end
is clear. In t he a bsence of sta tu tory sa nction of forfeitur e, cou r t s
d isp lay an  in crea sing wi llingn es s t o soften  the  impact  of
forfeitu re  or t o avoid it  a lt oget her . Th e followin g sect ion s
exa min e t he se ju dicial a ppr oache s m ore closely.
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A. Recognition of an Equity of Redempt ion
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1337 (Haw . 1978). 
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44. Id . at 240.
 Numerous cour t s  have  held tha t  a  purchaser  in d efau lt  has
the r igh t  t o defea t  for fe iture by t ender ing  the con t ract
balan ce.39 Wh ile  thes e ca se s oft en  in volve  pu rchasers who have
already pa id  a  su bs tan t ia l pa r t  of the con t ract  obliga t ion ,40
some pur chaser s ha ve been  su ccessful even  th ough t heir
p rev ious paymen t s r epresen t  as lit t le a s 1 6% of con t ract
amoun t .41 Some cour ts condition specific per formance  on  the
tar dy pur chaser  being free of bad fait h or gross n egligence.42
However , t h is  good  fa i th  requ iremen t h as sp ecifically been
rejected in Peterson v. Hartell,43 a lea ding California Su prem e
Cou r t  decision. In th at  case th e pu rch as ers  ha d been  in de fau lt
for  se ver a l years a nd t heir  condu ct  could accura tely be
described as  both  wilful a nd  gross ly negligen t. In  reject ing a ny
role for  t r i a l cour t  d iscre t ion ,  the supreme cour t  he ld  tha t
a  ven de e w h o h as  m ad e su bst an tia l pa ym en ts  on  a  lan d
ins t a l lmen t  s a l e c on t r a c t  or  s u b s t a n t ia l  im p r o v em e n t s  o n  t h e
p r o pe r t y an d w h ose  de fau lts , al bei t w ilfu l, con sis t s olely  of
f a i lu re  t o pay  fu r th e r  am oun t s  du e , h a s  a n  u n con d it ion a l r ig h t
t o a  r ea sonab le  oppor tun i ty  to  comple t e  th e  p u r cha se  by
p a yin g th e en tir e r em ain in g  ba la n c e , p l u s  d a m a g e s  b efo r e t h e
se l l er  i s  a l lowed  to  qu ie t  t i t l e .44
By permi t t ing t he t a rdy  pu rchase r  to ten de r  the ba la nce of
th e pu rchase  pr ice a nd a cqu ir e t it le t o the la nd,  cour t s in  effect
a re goin g a  lon g wa y t owa rd r ecogn izing a n  equit y of
r edemp tion  in  the purchase r . Bu t  note t ha t  most  of th e
foregoing cour t s r equ ir e a s a  condi t ion  for  redempt ion  one or
bot h  of th e following: (1) tha t t he pu rcha ser be free  of bad  fa i th
and gr oss  negl igence; a nd (2) t ha t  he or sh e ha ve mad e either
subs tan t ia l payments  on  the con t ract  or  improvements  to the
premises. It  is in t hes e lat ter  condition s t ha t t he foregoin g
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cases s t r ay from th e mor tga ge law a na logy. Mort gage la w
sim ply give s a  t a rdy  mor tga gor  the  r ight  t o red eem  un til va lidly
foreclosed—issues  of his ba d faith , gross negligence or failur e to
ma ke s ub st an tia l pa yme nt s or im pr ovemen ts  ar e ir re leva nt .45
B. Restitut ion to the Purchaser
 Assume tha t  a  ju r isd ict ion  ha s not yet  adop ted the foregoing
equ i ty of redem pt ion  a ppr oach or t ha t t he p ur cha ser  is u na ble
or  un willing to r edee m. H er e, a gr owing n um ber  of cour ts  give
the pu rchaser  a “rest itu tion ” rem edy. Th ey hold t ha t forfeit ur e
may  not  be “free” and th at t he vendor is obligated to re tu rn  the
paymen t s she h as r eceived to th e extent  tha t t hey exceed her
actua l dama ges.46 Such da ma ges normal ly  cons is t  ei ther  of the
ven dor ’s loss of bargain  or  the  fa i r  r en ta l  va lue of the  rea l
e st a t e during pur chaser ’s possession, plus in cidenta l dam ages
such  as r epair s an d costs  of resa le.47 Of cours e, t his  appr oach
may be less pleasin g to the pu rcha ser  th an  it s eem s. Fr equ ent ly
re st i t ut ion  is denied because th e vendor’s da m a ges exceed
purchaser ’s payments. 48 Moreover, even wh ere th e convers e is
t r ue, some courts deny recovery to the purchaser unless t he
excess over the ve ndor ’s d amages  is  “un conscionable ” or a t  least
“subst an tia l.”49
Th e r e st it u t ion  rem ed y h as s een  it s m ost  sign ifica n t
development  i n Ca li forn ia . Note  fi r st  t ha t  unde r  Venable v.
Harmon,50 a ven dor m ay n ot obt ain  a d eficiency judgment
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51. 230 P. 2d  629  (Ca l. 1 951 ).
52. 707 P. 2d  232 , 24 2 (Ca l. 1 985 ).
53. 415 P. 2d  833  (Ca l. 1 966 ).
54. S ee id. at 834.
55. J O H N R. H E T L AN D , SECURED REAL E S T AT E  TR A N SA C TI O N S 52 (1 974 ).
56. S ee Honey, 415 P.2d at 834.
57. S ee supra  note s 39-45 an d accompa nyin g text .
irr esp ective  of his loss. Moreover,  Californ ia cas e law  compels
the vendor  to re tu rn  to the  pur cha ser  an y am oun t p aid  in
excess of the  ven dor ’s  damages . In  Freedm an v. R ector,
Wardens and  Ves trymen  of  S t . Math ias Par ish ,51 for exa mple,
the Californ ia S up rem e Cour t h eld t ha t it  violate d st at e pu blic
policies again st forfeitur es, pena lties an d un just en richmen t t o
deny rest itut ion, even in t his case wher e the pu rchas er was
wil fu lly in d efau lt. La te r, Peterson v. Hartell r ea ffi rmed  tha t
forfeitu re  “should become effect ive  only u pon  [ven dor ’s]
pa yme nt  of the  su ms  du e t o [pur cha ser ] as r est itu tion .”52
What  is t he r est itu tion  am oun t t o which t he Ca liforn ia
pur chaser  i s en t it led? Und er t he r easonin g of th e supr eme
cour t  in  Honey v. Henry’s Fran chise L easin g Corp.,53 the vendor
ap pa ren tly  has t wo op t ion s for  mea su r in g h is  or  h e r  dama ges.
One op t ion  i s to use the  “ren ta l va l ue” (givin g r es t it u t ion  of th e
amount  by which the purchaser’s pa ymen ts  exceed t he fa ir
ren ta l value of the pr emises wh ile the pu rcha ser was in
possess ion). The a ltern at ive is the “difference value” (giving
rest i t ut ion  of the  amount  by which th e pur chaser ’s paym ent s
exceed th e differen ce between th e curr ent  ma rk et  va lue  and the
higher  con t r act  p r ice ).54 The l at t er  app roach is likely to be
favored only in falling real estat e mark ets. As Professor
Het land ap tly p oint ed ou t, “ra re ly over th e past  few decades
has th e value of the  proper ty  dropped  so tha t  t he  vendor  p refe r s
di ffer en ce valu e to h is a lter na tive—r ent al va lue.”55 In  any
event,  the choice is th e  ve n dor ’s,  according t o Honey,  because
permit t ing th e pu rch as er t o ma ke it  would in  effect give all
con t ract  purchasers an  option  to conve r t  t hei r  con t r act s  in to
l eases—an  advan tage  the cour t  ha rd ly  though t  appropr ia t e .56
C. T reatm ent a s a M ortgage
 As noted ea rlier ,5 7  s ev er a l  cou r t s  r ecog n ize an  equ ity  of
red emp tion  in  th e pu rch as er, a lbeit s ubject  to cert ain
limitat ions. These cases  gener ally give th e pu rch as er in  defau lt
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 3\ F I N A L \ N E L - F I N .W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
1111] CONTRACT FOR DEE D AS MORTGAGE 1127
58. S ee Ku ba ny  v. Wo ods , 62 2 S o. 2d  22 (F la. Dist. Ct . App . 19 93) (d ict um );
Skendzel  v. Marshall, 301 N.E.2d 641 (Ind. 1973); Sebastian  v. Floyd, 585 S.W.2d 381
(Ky. 1979); Bean  v. Walk er, 46 4 N.Y.S.2d 8 95 (App. Div. 1983 ); see also OKLA. STAT .
AN N . ti t.  16,  § 11A (W es t 1 983 ).
59. RE S T AT E M E N T, supra  no te  2, § 3 .4 cm t.  b(3).
60. 301 N. E. 2d  641  (In d. 1 973 ).
61. Id . at 646.
62. S ee id  at 650.  
63. S ee Looney v. Fa rm er s H ome  Adm in. , 794  F.2 d 31 0 (7t h C ir . 198 6); Ne lson
the right to redeem  by paying off the contr act ba lance.
However , a  gr owin g n umber  of ju r isdict ion s  h ave t aken  the
ne xt  logical st ep an d lar gely concluded th at  cont ra cts for deed
must  be govern ed bot h p rocedu ra lly an d su bst an tive ly by th e
law  of mor tgages.58 Un der  th is a ppr oach, t he p ur cha ser  who is
un ab le or u nw illing t o red eem  ha s t he  righ t
t o have  th e  va lue  o f t he  l an d  t e s t ed  a t  a  pu b l i c forec losu re  sa l e .
I f th e p rop er ty  sel ls for  m ore  th an  th e con t r a ct  p r ice , t h e
pur chase r  has  t he  r igh t  t o  the  su r p lus . I f  t he  sa l e  y i e lds  l e s s
t h a n  th e con tr act  de bt  th e ve n dor , u n le ss  p roh ib i ted  by
s t a tu t e ,  i s  en t i t l ed  to  a  de fi ci ency  judgm en t . 59
The judicial movement toward treat ing the contract for deed
as  a m ort gage is  most  developed  in In dia na . The  lead ing cas e is
Sk endzel v. Marsh all.60 In  th at  case t he ven dor s ought  a ju dicial
declar at ion of forfeitur e of a defau lting pu rcha ser ’s interest
where $21,0 00 of the $36 ,00 0 of t he con t r a ct  price had already
been pa id . In  orde r in g t ha t  the con tr act be  foreclosed in
accordance with  Ind iana  m or tgage  procedure , the  Ind iana
Supreme Cour t s ta te d t ha t “[c]oncept ua lly . . . t he  reten t ion  of
the t itle  by t he ve ndor  is  the s ame a s r es er vin g a  lien  or
mor t gage. Realistically, vendor-vendee should be viewed as
mor tgagee-mor tgagor . To conceive of th e re lat ionsh ip in
differen t  te rm s is t o pay h oma ge to form  over s ub st an ce.”61 The
cour t  l imi t ed  for fe itu re  to cases  of abandon ing  pu rchaser s  or  t o
s itua t ions where  a  min imal  a m ou n t  has  been  pa id  on  the
con t ract  and  the purchaser  seeks to re ta in  possess ion  while the
ven dor  is m ak ing exp en dit ur es for t axe s, in s u rance , and
ma inten an ce.62
Over the past  two decades Sk endzel ha s become fir m ly
ent ren ched in  In diana  la w. N umer ous a pp ell a te d ecis ion s
either  uphold or require judicial foreclosure  of contracts for
deed.63 While most  of the se ca ses  involve pu rch as er s wh o ha ve
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v. Gurley, 673 N.E.2d 497 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Parker  v. Camp, 656 N .E.2d 882 (Ind.
C t . App. 1995); S.B.D. Inc. v. Sai Mah en, I nc., 560  N. E. 2d  86 (I nd . Ct . App . 19 90);
Tidd v. Stau ffer, 308 N.E.2d 415 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974); Fisel v. Yoder, 320 N.E.2d 783
(Ind. Ct. App. 1 974). 
64. S ee L oo ne y v . F a r m er s Home  Admin., 794  F.2d 310  (7th Cir . 1986) (holding
tha t  under  Skendzel , foreclosure, n ot forfeitu re, sh ould h ave  been or dere d even  th ough
purcha ser  had  pa id only $640 of principal on a $250,000 contra ct price where
purcha ser  ha d pa id over $ 122,000 in inter est a nd wh ere a ppr eciation  in lan d valu e
created  an  equ it y in  exce ss  of $9, 000 ).
65. S ee, e.g.,  Phillips v. Nay, 456 N.E.2d 745 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (sus ta inin g
forfeitur e decr ee w he re  les s t ha n 1 0% of con tr act  price was paid and purchaser also
failed to i ns ur e or  pa y r ea l es ta te  ta xes ).
66. S ee Pa rk er v. C am p, 656 N .E.2 d 882 (Ind. Ct . App . 199 5) (h oldi ng  cont ra ct
pr ovisi on  wh ich p er mi tt ed t he  ven dor  to ob ta in for fe it u r e un til pu rcha ser  ha d paid
75% of th e con tr act  pr ice vo id a s a  ma tt er  of pu blic policy and incons is t en t  wi th
Skendzel).
67. 464 N. Y.S. 2d  895  (App . Di v. 1 983 ).
68. Id . at 898.
69. S ee id .
made  su bs tan t ia l r ed uct ion s of con t r act  p r incipa l , t he re a re
de cis ion s manda t ing foreclosu re wh er e cont ra ct pa yme nt s h ave
been  rela tively m inim al. 64 To be su re, a  few pa st  ap pella te
de cis ion s had  a ffi rmed  for fe itu res wher e  ther e was s ign ifica n t
pr incipa l r educt ion ,  bu t  p u rchasers in those cases had
commi t ted significan t n onmonet a r y  d efa u lt s as  well.65
Moreover , at  leas t on e decis ion  finds  viola t ive  of pu bli c pol icy
con t ract  la ngu age b y wh ich  the p urchase r  pu rpor t s to wa ive his
Sk endzel rights.66 Wh ile  cont ract  for  de ed  for feit u re h as n ot
been  pu t t o rest  complet ely in In dia na , it is fa ir t o say t ha t it s
final requ iem will likely come sooner  ra th er t ha n lat er.
The foregoing a pp roach  is  a lso reflect ed  in  Ne w Yor k
in te rmed ia t e appel la te  cour t s . In  Bean  v . Walker,67 t he  t a rdy
purchaser s had paid a lmost  ha lf of th e origin al p rin cipal
amount  on  a  contr act for deed for th e sale of a house. In
add it ion , th ey had  ma de subs ta nt ial impr ovement s  t o the
pr oper ty.  T h e Ne w Yor k Su pr em e Cour t , Appe lla te Division ,
findin g “no reason  why th e inst an t vend ees should be t rea ted
any d iffe ren t ly  than  the mor tgagor  a t  common  law,” r eversed a
tr ial cour t forfeiture d ecree and  held tha t  “the  con t ract  ven dor s
may not  summar ily disposs ess t he ven dees  of their  equ ita ble
ownersh ip without  first br inging an  action to foreclose the
vendee’s equ ity of re dem pt ion.”68 However , t he  cour t  also
adopted  the Sk endzel l imi ta t ions  on  the  purchaser ’s  r igh t  to the
foreclos ure remedy.69 Subsequ ent  decisions h ave imposed
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70. S ee Madero v. Hen ness, 607 N.Y.S.2d 153, 155 (App. Div. 1994) (holding
tha t  even though purchaser s who ha d paid  alm ost 1/3 of the  contr act pr ice were in
de fau l t , “g iven  tha t  .  . .  t hei r  in t e re st  t he rein  had no t  been  fo rec losed, the [ t r ia l
cour t ] was eminently correct in ordering [vendor] to accept the insura nce proceeds in
paymen t of [vendee’s] rem ain ing obliga tion s un der  th e cont ra ct.”); Call v. LaBr ie, 498
N.Y.S.2d 652 (App. Div. 1986) (findin g th at  paym ent by pu rchase r  of  over  12% of  the
cont rac t pr ice d eem ed s uffici en t t o con v er t  c ont ra ct for deed in to an  equit able
mo rt ga ge).
71. 585 S.W .2d  381  (Ky.  197 9).
72. Id . at 383.
73. Id . at 384.
74. S ee, e.g., Wh it e v.  Br ou ss ea u,  566  So. 2 d 8 32 (F la . Di st . Ct . App. 1990);
Hoffm an  v . S e m et, 316 So. 2d 64 9 (Fla. Dis t. Ct . App. 1975); H & L Lan d Co. v.
Warner , 258  So. 2 d 2 93 (F la . Di st . Ct . App . 19 72).
75. S ee, e.g., Ricard  v. Equ ita ble Life Assur an ce Soc’y, 462 So. 2d 592 (Fla . Dist.
mor tgage t re at me nt  in ca ses  involvin g lower p er cent age
pr incipa l  r educt ions  than  in  Bean.70
Kentucky has given the m ost  unqu a lified  su pp or t  for
t rea t ing the  con t r act  for dee d  as  a  mor tgage . In  Sebastian v.
Floyd,71 th e Ken tu cky Su pr em e Cour t r eversed a  t r ia l  cou r t
forfeitu re  de cree  wh er e t he p urchase r  had p a id  nea r ly fou r ty
percen t of th e pr in cipa l ba la nce on  a  cont ract  for  de ed  for  the
sa le of a  house.  The  cour t  det ect ed a  “modern  t r end  . .  .  to t r ea t
l and sa le  con t ract s  as  ana logous t o conventiona l mortga ges,
thus requ i r ing  a  se ll er  to seek  a  judicial  sale of th e propert y
upon th e bu yer ’s de fau lt.”72 Consequen tly, the court  deter mined
“tha t  a  r u l e treat ing the seller’s interest as a lien will best
protect  th e int ere st s of both bu yer a nd  seller . Ord ina ri ly,  the
seller will receive th e ba lan ce due on  th e contr act , plus
expenses, thus  fu lfilling the expecta tions h e ha d when  he
agreed  to sell  h i s l a nd.”73 While the court  cited Sk endzel with
ap pr oval, its opinion did not  include  the l imi ta t ions  on  the
foreclos ure r em ed y suggest ed  by t he Indiana  de cis ion .
The Florid a d ecisions, while s omet imes  conceptu ally
impr ecise, poin t unmis t akably to the conclusion  tha t  a  con t ract
for  deed is a  m or t g a ge and  tha t  a  pu rchaser  has  an  absolu te
righ t  to its foreclosure. While th ere is  no d irect  holding of the
Flor ida  Supreme Court to that  effect, suppor t  for  th i s
pr oposition  is  plen t ifu l in  other  app ell a te d ecis ion s.  Nu mer ous
Flor ida  case s r ecogn ize  a  ta rdy  pu rchase r ’s r igh t  to red em pt ion
or  specific perform an ce.74 Moreover, vendors th emselves  appear
to tr eat  cont ra cts for deed a s mort gages because t h ey rout inely
choose  to foreclose them as m ortgages.75 More  impor t an t ,
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Ct . App. 1985); Pa rise  v. Citizen s Na t’l Bank , 438 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
198 3); Ea rn es t v . Ca rt er , 36 8 S o. 2d  428  (Fl a.  Dis t.  Ct . App . 19 79).
76. S ee, e.g., Kuban y v. Woods, 622 So. 2d 22 (F la. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Lunek e
v. Becker, 621 So. 2d 744, 746 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (“[T]he vend or  .  . .  ha s no
r igh t  to r epos ses s t he  pr oper ty; t he  ven dor  mu st  pr oce e d w it h  a  fore closu re  act ion.
Accordin gly, the proper remedy in this case was not  ejectment, but a foreclosure
action .”) (citation s omit ted); Whit e v. Brou ssea u, 566 So. 2d 83 2 (Fla. Dis t . Ct. App.
199 0).
77. 566 So. 2 d 8 32 (F la . Di st . Ct . App . 19 90).
78. Id . at  835  (cit at ion  om it te d).
79. S ee supra text a ccompa nying notes  60-66.
80. 707 P. 2d  232  (Ca l. 1 985 ).
numerous F lorida cases , i n a  va r ie ty of con text s , s t a t e t ha t  a
con t ract  for deed is a mortgage and must be foreclosed as a
mort gage.76 For  example, in  reve rsing t he t r ia l cou r t ’s
t e rmina t ion  of a  purchaser ’s  con t ract  for  deed in teres t , the
Dist r ict  Cour t  of Appea l s s t a t ed  unambigu ou sly in White v.
Brousseau 77 t ha t
[a ]n  equ ity  ju dg m en t m ay  n ot  . . . “ca n ce l” a  la n d  con t r a ct
bu y e r ’s  eq u it a ble  ti tl e or  ot h er wi se  de cr ee  a  for feit u r e of t h e
b u y er -d e bt or ’s  in te r es t i n  la n d i n  fa vor  of th e  s e ller -cre dit or.
T h e la n d con tr a c t  mus t  be  forec losed  in  equ i ty  in  th e  sam e
ma nn er  a s p ro vid ed  for for ecl os u r e of m o rt ga g es  a n d t h e
equ ita ble  t i t le  of t h e  l a n d  co n t r a ct  b u y er ,  li k e t h e  l e ga l  t i t l e  of
a  m or tgagor ,  t e rmina ted  by  a  jud ic i a l  s a l e.78
Unlike Sk endzel, t he F lor ida cases  con ta in  no l anguage
au thor izing for feit u re in  exce pt ion a l cir cumst ances  s u ch  as
pur chaser  aba ndonm ent  of th e prem ises  or  where  the
pu rchase r  has m ade  only n omin a l paym en ts on  the con t ract .79
On th e oth er h an d, t he Ca lifornia  Supreme Cour t  thus  fa r
has de clin ed  to confer  fu ll m or tga ge  t r eatm ent on contracts for
deed. In  Peterson v. Hartell,80 consider ed ea rlier  in t his  Ar t icle,
th e cour t sp ecifically rejected th e ur ging of it s t hen  chief just ice
to t r ea t  t he  con t r act  for  deed a s  a  mor tgage for all pur poses by
limit ing the ve ndor ’s r em ed y a ga in st  a  pu rchase r  in  de fau lt  t o
foreclos ure by public sale irr espective of whether  substan t i a l
paymen t s on  the  con t ract  had  been  made.  Because the
purchaser s in Petersen  had  made subs tan t ia l con t ract  paymen t s
and wer e willing t o ten der  th e ba lan ce due, t hey did not s eek
the foreclosure  rem edy. Conseq uen tly, t he cour t n oted t ha t it
“tw ice declined  sim ilar  invitat ions to consider  such innovations”
and concluded tha t “sound developm e n t  of the  law in  th i s
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81. Id . at 234 n .1.
82. OKLA. STAT . AN N . t i t .  16, § 11A (West 1983); see  als o TE X. P ROP . CO D E  AN N .
§§ 5.091-.092 (West 1983) (requirin g power of sale foreclosure of contra cts for deed
where 40% or more of the price has  been  p a id , t he  con t r ac t  is  on  l and tha t  i s t he
purchase r ’s res idence, t he la nd is in  a low-income coun ty, an d th e lan d  is  w it h in 200
miles  o f an  in t erna t iona l  bo rde r ).
83. S ee Pa na ma  Timb er C o. v. Bar san ti, 633  P.2d  1258 (Okla . Ct. App. 1 980).
F o r a good analysis of the Okla homa st atu te, see  Dre w Ker she n, Con tr act s for  Deed
in  Ok lah om a: Obs olete,  Bu t N ot F orgot ten , 15 OKLA. CITY U. L. RE V. 715, 752 (1990)
(“I f attorneys use contracts for deed to transfer Oklahoma real esta te , th ey h ave  not
accomplished  legally anyth ing different, un der Okla homa la w, t h a n  if they had u sed
a  de ed  an d m or tg ag e.”).
84. UNIF . LAND SEC UR ITY INTERE ST ACT § 102, 7A U.L.A. § 102(b) (1997). 
complex ar ea can  best be a ssu red  by limi t ing ou r  holdings  to
the issu es n ecessa rily pr esen te d for de cision.”81 Nevertheless,
given the va r iet y of lim it a t ion s th e Ca l iforn ia  Supreme Cour t
has a lr eady imposed  on  the  use  of the  con t ract  for  deed,  the
chances a re  st rong tha t  fu l l mor tgage t r ea tmen t  is  ju s t  a
ma tt er of time.
Mor tgage t r ea tmen t  for  t he  con t ract  for  deed ha s also been
the product  of legis la t ion.  Okla h om a,  in  a  sweep ing  and
decisive statu te enacted in 1976, provides that:
All c on t r a c t s  for  deed  for  pu rchase  a nd  sa l e  of  r ea l  p rope r ty
m a d e  f or  t h e  p u r p o s e  or  w it h  t h e inte nt ion of  receiving t he
p a ym e n t  o f money  a n d  ma de for  th e pu rpose of  es ta bl ishing a n
i m m e d i a t e and  con t inu ing  r igh t  o f  posses s ion  o f  t he  desc r ibed
rea l  proper ty,  whe t her  such  ins t ru men ts  be  fr o m  t h e  d e bt o r  t o
t h e cred itor  or fr om  th e de bt or t o som e t hir d p er son  in t r u s t
for  t h e  cr e d it o r , s h a l l t o  t h a t  e x te nt  be d eem ed a nd  he ld
mor tga ges , and  sha l l  be  sub jec t  t o  the  s a me  r u l e s  o f
forec losu re  an d t o th e sa m e r egu la tion s, r es tr ai n ts  an d for m s
as  a r e  p re sc r ibed  in  r e l a t ion  to  mor tgages . 82
The foregoing s t a tu t e t r ea t s  a ll  con t ract s  for  deed en ta il ing  a
t ran sfer of possess ion  to the  purchaser  as  mor tgages  and  thus
ma kes  the forfeitur e remedy un availa ble.83 F ina lly,  the  Un i form
Land Securit y Inter est Act (ULSIA), promu lgated in  1985 by
the Nat iona l  Confe rence of Com missioner s on  Un ifor m St a te
Laws, but as of this writing not enacted in any state, adopts
mortgage treatment  for th e contract for deed.84 It  provides:
[T]his  [A ct ] a p p li es  t o a n y  t r a n sa ct io n , r e ga r d les s of its  form ,
in t end ed  to cr e a t e a  s ecu ri ty  in te re st  in  re a l es ta te . Th is [Act ]
gove rns  se cu ri ty  in te re st s cr ea te d b y con t r a c t  o r  conveyance ,
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85. Id . (se con d a nd  th ir d a lt er at ion s in  or igin al ) (cit at ion s om it te d).
86. See, for exam ple, Grom bon e v. K rek el,  754 P.2d 777, 778 (Colo. Ct. App.
198 8),  sta tin g:
The decision whet her a n insta llment l a n d  co n t r a ct is to be treated as a
mort gage  is commit ted to th e soun d di scr et ion of t he  tr ial  cour t, b as ed on
the facts presented . .  .  .  There ar e nu mer ous Colora do decisions wh ich ha ve
required  tha t  a n  installment land contract must be foreclosed as a
mortgage.  There are also many cases which h ave  re fused  to t rea t  such  an
agreemen t as a m ortgage.
The factors to be used by the tr ia l  cou r t  inc lude  the amoun t o f t he
vendee’s equity in th e proper ty, the l engt h of th e defa ult  per iod, th e
wilfulness of the default , whether  the vendee h as ma de improvemen t s ,  a nd
wheth er  the property ha s been adequat ely maintained.
Id . (cit at ion s om it te d).
87. S ee RE S T AT E M E N T, supra no te  2, § 8 .2(b ).
88. S ee id . § 8.2 (a).
inclu din g a m ort ga ge, d ee d of t ru st , tr u st  de ed , secu rit y  d e e d ,
con t r a ct  fo r  deed ,  l and  sa l e s  con t r ac t  .  . .  and  an y  o the r
consen sua l  lien  or  con tr a ct for  re te n ti on  of t it le  in t e n d ed  a s
se cur ity  for a n  obliga tion .85
In  su m, s ever al stat es, including such influential states as
New York , F lor ida ,  and Ca li forn ia  have in lar ge meas ur e opted
to tr eat  cont ra cts for dee d su bst an tive ly an d pr ocedur ally a s
mor tgages. Whe ther  t he  movemen t  t o mor tgage  t r ea tmen t  i s
judicia lly ins pir ed or  th e pr oduct  of legis la t i on , th ere is every
rea son t o expect it  to contin ue, es pecially in  st at es in  which  the
con t r act  for  deed has  not  been  in s t it u t iona li zed by s t a tu t e.86
V. OT H E R  VE N D O R  RE M E D IE S
 Even  where forfeitur e is availa ble, it w ill somet imes be  an
undesir able  option for t he vend or. This will be the case wh ere
t he rea l es ta te is  now wor th  les s t han  the con t ract  pr ice. Of
course, were t he ve ndor  a  mor tga gee  unde r  a  mor tga ge or  deed
of tru st,  or should a cour t  choose  to app ly m or tga ge l aw t o the
con t r act , the alter na tive rem edies norm ally would be clear . The
ven dor  could opt t o foreclose a nd  if the  foreclosur e sale yields
less th at  wha t wa s owing, a deficiency judgm ent  would be
ava ilable  for t he difference between t he  sa le p r ice  and the
obliga t ion .87 Alt er na t ive ly,  the ve ndor  could  su e on  the  con t ract
obliga t ion , ob ta in  a  judgment  for  tha t  a m ount  and  col lect  the
judgment ou t  of a l l of the  purchaser ’s  asse t s , including the
contr act land.88
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89. S ee, e.g., F i rst N at ’l Bank v. Cape, 673 P.2d 502 (N.M. 1983); Par k Valley
Corp. v. Bagley, 635 P.2d 65 (Utah 1981); Stonebra ker  v. Zinn, 286 S.E.2d 9 11 (W.
Va.  198 2).
90. S ee Thoma s v. Klein, 577 P.2d 1153 (Idaho 1978); Ellis v. Butterfield, 570
P.2d 133 4 (Ida ho  197 7).
91. S ee RE A L E S T AT E  F I N AN C E  LAW , supra note 1, at  96.
92. S ee, e.g.,  Steinhoff v. Fisch, 847 P.2d 191 (C olo. Ct. App. 1992); Puziss  v.
Unfortu na tely, i n mos t  s ta t es , t h e vend or’s opt ions will
har dly be so u n a m biguous. Courts  comm only apply either
con t ract  law 89 or a  confusin g combin a t ion of mort gage an d
cont ract  principles.90 Moreover , even in  st at es t ha t la rgely
ut ilize a  mor t gage l aw a na logu e in  in ter pr et in g con t ract s for
de ed , cou r t s h ave yet  to confront  or  work thr ough the m yriad of
collater al  i ssues  a n d  im p li ca t i on s  t h a t  a  m or t g a ge
ch a r a ct e r iz a ti on  crea tes . However , somet ime s con t r a ct
rem edies permit a vendor to achieve indirect ly wha t is  us ua lly
ava ilable  a s  a  ma t t er  of cour se in  th e m ort gage la w cont ext .
Also, somet imes  a cour t will  a llow a  ven dor  to opt  for  a
mor tgage  rem ed y wh er e for feit u re a nd con t ract  la w a re n ot  to
h i s likin g—in effect, he is  per mit ted  to “have h is cake  and  ea t  it
too.” Wha t  fol lows i s a  descr ipt ion  and  analys is  of some of these
nonforfeiture remedies.
A. S peci fi c Perform an ce for  th e Price
 Suppose a contr act purcha ser  goes into default because the
valu e of the real estat e has dropped significantly below th e
remain ing con t ract  balan ce. In other  words , the  purchaser ,  who
is other wise  able  to pa y, h as m ade  a  ra t ion a l decision  “not  t o
th row good  money a fte r  bad .” From the vendor’s pers pective,
the idea l rem edy would  be sp ecific per forma nce. Un der  th is
approach , the  vendor  t enders  tit le to the land an d seeks an
equita ble decree compelling th e pur chaser  to pay th e balan ce of
the contr act  pr ice. The a na logue, of cour se, is  a  ven dor ’s a ct ion
for  specific performa nce where a pu r ch aser  fa i ls  or  r e fuses  to
per form un der  an  ear nes t m oney contr act  for th e sa le of land.9 1
In  th is  la t t er  se t t in g, s pe cific p er formance is  almos t  a lways
grant ed. Sh ould t his  rem edy a lso be rou tin ely ava ilable in  th e
con t ract  for  deed set t ing?
In  fact, vendor s  a r e frequen t ly s ucces sfu l in  their  qu es t  for
specific performa nce,92 a l though , in  a  few cases , a s  in  the  ea r
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Geddes, 771 P.2d  1028 (Or. Ct . App. 1989); Simon H ome Bu ilder s, In c. v. Pailoor, 357
N.W.2d 383 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); SAS Par t ner sh ip v. S cha fer , 653  P.2 d 83 4 (Mon t.
198 2).
93. S ee Pe rr on  v. H al e, 7 01 P .2d  198  (Id ah o 198 5); Sucha n v. Ruth erford, 410
P.2d 434 (Ida ho 1966 ); Seaba ugh  v. Keele, 77 5 S.W.2d 2 05 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989);
Centex  Ho me s C or p. v . Boa g, 3 20 A. 2d  194  (N. J . Su pe r.  Ct . Ch . Di v. 1 974 ).
94. S ee Ho lm an  v. H an se n,  773  P. 2d  120 0 (Mon t. 1989); William son v.
Magnusson , 336  N. W.2 d 3 53 (N .D.  198 3).
95. S ee Rick el v . E ne rg y Sy s. H oldi ng s, L td ., 7 59 P .2d  876  (Id ah o 198 8).
96. S ee Ca rp en te r v . Sm it h,  383  N. W.2 d 2 48 (M ich . Ct . App . 19 85).
nest  money con text ,93 cou r t s  r equire t he vendor to establish
tha t  th e rem edy at  law is ina dequa te. 94 Wher e th is r eme dy is
availa ble, th e cour t en ter s a decree a gainst  th e pu r ch a ser  for
th e full cont ract  ba la nce which  is  collect ibl e by a  judicia l sa le of
the pur chaser ’s ass ets, includin g the contr act pr operty. Note,
however, tha t  the con cep tua l r oadb lock s t o sp ecifi c pe r formance
a re mor e tr oublesom e in  the con t r act  for  deed set t i ng  than  with
resp ect to i t s ea rnes t  money con t ract  coun te r pa r t . The lat ter
con t r act , because  it  is  exe cutory, typ ica lly  pr ovid es  for  the
payment of th e bala nce of th e contr act  pr ice on one closing dat e,
while  the contr act for deed, a s  a  long ter m fin an cing device, is
usua lly a m ort ized in inst allmen ts over a  longer period of time.
Cons equ en tly,  when  a  pur chaser  un der a n ea rn est m oney
cont ract  default s on th e closing da te, th e cont ra ct can be
tr eat ed as completely repudiated, and a specific per formance
decree for  t he  fu l l con t r act  p r ice is h ar dly conceptu ally difficult .
On th e other  ha nd, wh en a  cont ra ct for deed p ur chaser
defaults,  a  su it  for  more  than the  pas t  due  in s t allment s can be
pr oblema tic for t he vend or. This is because m any contr acts for
deed, unl ike most  mor tga ge d ocumen ts,  conta in  no accele ra t ion
clause  wh ich  permi ts t h e ven dor  to de cla re t he en t ir e con t ract
ba lance due a nd pa yable up on  pur cha ser  defau lt. Wh ere  th is is
the case,  the vendor may only be able to sue for th e past due
inst a llmen t s p lus  in t e res t .95 To be sure , a  cour t  may
occas iona lly come t o the ven dor’s r escu e by a pplyin g th e
con t ract  doct r in e of a n t icip a tory r ep udia t ion  as a  ba si s for
acce le ra t ion .96 Ne ver thele ss , t he a bs en ce of a n  accele ra t ion
pr ovision surely p resent s  a  subs tant ial obstacle for th e vendor
seeking sp ecific perform an ce.
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97. S ee F REYFOGLE , supra  no te  13,  § 84D .05 [4].
98. S ee GR A N T S. NE L S O N  & DALE A. WHIT MAN , REAL E S T AT E  TR AN S F E R, F INANCE
A N D DE V E L OP M E N T 43 (5 th  ed . 19 98).
99. S ee He rr in gt on  v. M cCoy,  434  N. E. 2d  67 (I ll. C t.  App . 19 82).
100. S ee infra  note s 111-121 an d accompa nyin g text .
101. S ee RE A L E S T AT E  F I N AN C E  LAW , supra note 1, at  99.
102. S ee supra  note s 57-86 an d accompa nyin g text .
103. S ee, e.g,  Rickel v. Energy Sys. Holdings, Ltd., 759 P.2d 876 (Idaho 1988);
M u s t a rd v. Suga r Valley La kes, 642  P.2d 111  (Kan. Ct . App. 1981); Jone s v. B u r r,
B. Acti on  for  Da m ages
 In theory, a contract for deed vendor, like his earn est  money
cont ract  coun te rpa r t , shou ld be ab le  to sue the  pu rchaser  i n
defau lt  for  da mages  for  br ea ch  of cont ract .97 Using the earnest
money analogy, the vendor ’s dam ages sh ould be meas ur ed by
the di ffer en ce bet ween  the con t ract  ba lance an d th e fair ma rk et
valu e of the property as of t h e  da t e of t he p urchase r ’s b rea ch .98
However , the  damages  remedy may only be ava il able where  the
pur chaser  has a bandoned the land. This is the case because
where forfeitur e is neces sa ry t o rega in  the p rope r ty, a n  act ion
for  d a mages could well be barred  by the election of rem edies
doctr ine,99 an  issue explored lat er in t his Art icle.100 P e r h a ps
more impor tan t ,  the ve n dor  faces a  s igni fi can t  p ragmat ic
prob lem—the factfinder (very often  a ju ry) mus t be convinced
tha t  the property,  as of th e dat e of th e brea ch, was wort h less
than  th e cont r act  pr ice. In oth er w ords , th e vend or m ay be in
the unen via ble  pos it ion  of pe r su ading t he fa ct  fin de r  tha t  he or
she conv inced the  purchaser  to en ter  in to a  “b a d dea l.”
Obvious ly, where a purchaser is capable of satisfying  a
judgmen t , the ve ndor  wou ld  confront  fewer  obs tacles in  su ing
for specific perform an ce for t he p rice. Not  only is  the e lect ion  of
rem edies pr oblem obviated,  so too i s the  burden  of p rov ing
dama ges.101
C. Foreclosure of Pur chas er’s R igh ts
 As th is Ar t icle expla in ed  ea r lier , se ver a l ju r is di ct ion s t r ea t
the con t ract  for deed as a mortgage for most purposes.102 Where
th i s is the case, t he vend or genera lly must  foreclose the
con t ract  as a mortgage. However, in jurisdictions w h er e the
m or t gage st a tus of t he con t ract  for  de ed  is  les s clea r , cou r t s
sometim es give  the ve ndor  the op t ion  to foreclose t h e contr act
for deed by judicial sale.103 This  ap pr oach se ems  conceptu ally
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389 N.W .2d  289  (Ne b. 19 86); M ack iew icz v. J.J . & Assocs., 514 N.W.2d 613 (Neb.
1994) (dictum ); Annota tion , Vendor’s Rem edy by a Foreclosure of Con tra ct for  S ale of
Real Property, 77  A.L. R. 2 70 (1 932 ).
104. S ee supra no te 96 and  accompanying t ext .
105. S ee, e.g., Gonzales v. Tama , 749  P .2d 1116 (N.M. 1988 ) (holding th at
mortgagee  perm itt ed to foreclose for en tir e mor tga ge oblig a tion  where defau l t  was
subs tan t ia l an d of lo ng  du ra ti on ).
106. RE A L E S T AT E  F I N AN C E  LAW , supra note 1, at  97.
107. S ee id .
pr oblema tic beca u se the vendor is seeking a mortgage remedy
un der  a d evice th at , to a gr eat er e xten t, is  govern ed by con t ract
law. In  an y event , wher e th is app roach  is  followed , t o the extent
the sa le y iel ds  more than  the  con t ract  ba lance , the pu rch as er is
ent itled to the surplus. Where the sale brings less than th e
con t ract  bala nce, t he ven dor n orm ally will be  en t it l ed  to a
de ficiency judgmen t . Note  tha t t h is  foreclosu re rou te  is
economically similar t o the specific performa nce remedy. In
each  s itua t ion ,  the vendor  obta ins  a ju dgm ent  for th e full
con t ract  ba lance , and  tha t  judgment may  be  sa t i sfi ed  ou t  of the
con t ract  real estate. In addit ion ,  the purchaser  in  each  set t ing
bea r s th e  r isk of postcontr act decline in t he valu e of th e rea l
esta te.
Moreover , as  we sa w ea rlier  in t he s pecific p er for mance
conte xt, 104 a  judgmen t  for  the r em ain in g con t ract  ba la nce
usua lly i s unavaila b le  un less the  con t ract  con ta ins an
accelera tion  clause. The  sa me p roble m exi st s w hen  the ve ndor
op t s for  foreclosur e. Un less  a cour t is  willin g to em ploy th e
an t icipa tory rep ud iat ion concept t o ma ke t he r ema inin g
ba lance due and owing ,105 th e vend or will be faced  with  th e
un desira ble option of foreclosing for the pa st d ue ins ta llment s.
To what  ext en t  then  do t he for eclos ure a nd s pe cific
per formance remedies  d iffe r? In  the forme r cont ext , “th e ven dor
will have t he p rotect ion  of a  lien  on the con t ra ct rea l  es t a t e
d a t ing from t he  execut ion or r ecordin g of the  contr act .”106 T h is
may not  be  the ca se  in  the s pe cific p er formance sett ing. Here
the ven dor ’s l ien  may be come effect ive on ly whe n t he s pecific
per formance decr ee is e nt er ed. Con sequ en tly,  th i s lien m ay we ll
be su bordin at e to oth er p ostcont ra ct lien s crea ted  by, or ar isin g
aga ins t , t he  pu rchaser .107
In  some sta tes, including a few tha t h ave no t rad it ion  of
foreclosing contr acts for deed by judicial sale, the ven dor will be
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108. S ee, e.g., Can ter bur y Cour t, In c. v. R os e n ber g, 5 82 P .2d  261  (Ka n.  197 8);
Ryan  v. Kolterma n, 338 N.W.2d 747 (Neb. 1983); Kallenbach v. Lake P ub lica tion s,
Inc.,  142 N .W.2d  212 (W is. 1 966); see also P a tr ick A. Ran dolph, Up da tin g th e Oregon
Ins ta l lmen t La nd  Con tr act , 15 WILLAMETTE  L. RE V. 181,  211-1 2 (197 9). N ote tha t
som e of th ese  cour ts  spe cifical ly give  th e ve nd or t he  opt ion of ch oosin g forfe itu re  or
str ict foreclosure. S ee Walke r v. Nu nn enk am p, 373 P.2d  559 (Idah o 1962); Zumst ein
v. St ockt on, 2 64 P .2d 4 55 (Or . 195 3). A few cou rt s gr an t s tr ict for eclos ur e wit hou t
cha rac te r iz ing it  as su ch—i ns te ad , t he y gr an t a  “gra ce pe ri od” du ri ng  wh ich  th e
purcha ser  may  pay  the con t r act balan ce; if purcha ser  fails to pa y, forfeitur e is
declared. S ee Jes z v. Geigle, 319 N.W.2d 481 (N.D. 1982); Moeller v. Good Hope
Farm s, 215 P .2d 425 (Wa sh. 1 950) (holdin g gra ce per iod discr etion ar y). 
109. S ee, e.g.,  Ryan v. Kolterman , 338 N.W.2d 747 (Neb. 1983); State Sec. Co. v.
Dar inger , 293  N. W.2 d 1 02 (N eb.  198 0).
110. S ee, e.g.,  Wa lker v. Nu nn enk am p, 373 P.2d  559 (Idah o 1962); Blondell v.
B ea m , 413  P. 2d  397  (Or . 19 66).
111. S ee RE A L E S T AT E  F I N AN C E  LAW , supra  note 1, § 8.1.
112. S ee id .
113. S ee, e.g., ARIZ. RE V. STAT . § 33-72 9(A) (1996 ); CAL . CIV. P ROC . CODE  § 580(b)
(Dee r ing 1992); N.C. GE N . STAT . § 45-21.38 (1996). 
able  to obta in strict foreclosure of t he  pu rchaser ’s  in t e res t .108
Und er  th is  app roach , t he con t ract  is  cancele d a nd t it le t o the
land is quieted  in th e vendor. However, th is rem edy is  subject
t o an  imp ort an t qu alificat ion. The  pu rch as er is  ent itled to
specific per for m a n ce  of the  con t ract  i f he  or  she t enders  the
ba lance due on t he contr act with in a “redem ption per iod” set by
the court .  Note  t h a t  a  failure t o redeem dep rives th e pur chaser
of an y “equity” in the r eal est at e. Consequ en tly, s ome cou r t s
will awa rd  st rict foreclosure only if the vendor establishes tha t
the valu e of the r eal e stat e does  not  exce ed  the con t ract
balan ce.109 Wher e such a n excess exists, th e cour t m ay inst ead
order jud icial foreclosure by sa le.110
D. Th e Election of Remedies Lim itation on Vend ors
In  a t ra dit iona l mor tga ge law s ett ing, if th e foreclosur e sa le
yields less t ha n t he m ort gage obligat ion an d t he m ort gagor is
per sona lly liable  on  tha t  ob liga t ion ,  the mor tgagee has the  r igh t
to ob ta in  a  judgment  for  the de ficiency a ga in st  the m or tga gor .111
Th is  de ficiency judgmen t n orma lly is for t he difference between
the mor tgage  ob liga t ion and th e foreclosure sa le price.112 Of
course, se ver a l s t a tes  place on e or  more s ta tu tory  limita t ions on
de ficiency judgmen t s. F or  exa mple, a  few pr ohibi t  de ficiency
judgmen t s a ft er t he foreclos ure of cer t a in  types  of pu rchase
money mortgages.113 In  add it ion , som e s ta tes  pr ohibi t  de ficiency
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114. S ee, e.g., ALASKA STAT . § 34.20-100 (Michie 199 7);  ARIZ. RE V. STAT . § 33-
814(E) (199 6);  CAL . CIV. P RO C . CO D E  § 580(d) (Dee ri ng  199 2);  MO N T. CO D E  AN N . 71-1-
317 (199 7).
115. S ee, e.g., CAL . CIV. P ROC . CODE  § 726(b) (Deering 1992); N.D. CE N T . CODE
32-10-04 (1996 ); TE X. P ROP . CO D E  AN N . §§ 51 .00 4, 5 1.0 05 (W es t 1 983 ).
116. S ee RE S T AT E M E N T, supra  note 2, § 8.4.
117. S ee, e.g., Nemec v. Rollo, 562 P.2d 1087 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977); Hep perly v.
Bosch , 527  N. E. 2d  533  (Ill . 19 88);  M ic h ig a n  Nat’l Bank v. Cote, 546 N.W.2d 247
(Mich . 1996); Grus kin v. F isher , 273 N.W.2d 893  (Mich. 1979); Covington  v. P r i t che t t ,
428 N.W.2d 121 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Porter v . Sm it h,  486  N. W.2 d 8 46 (N eb.  199 2);
Buckingham  v. Ryan , 953 P .2d 33 (N.M . Ct. App. 1 997); Tran s W. Co. v. Teuscher,
618 P.2d  1023 (Was h. Ct . App. 1980). 
118. S ee Brooks v. Su llivan, 72 8 S.W .2d 2 98 (Mo. C t. Ap p. 19 87); N em ec v. R ollo,
562 P. 2d  108 7 (Ar iz. C t.  App . 19 77).
119. S ee Hepper ly v. Bosch, 527 N.E.2d 533 (Ill. 1988); Risse v. Thompson, 471
N.W.2d 853 (Iowa 1 991). But see Rudn itski v. Seely, 441 N .W.2d 827 (Minn. Ct. App.
198 9),  rev’d in part , 45 2 N .W.2 d 6 64 (M in n.  199 0).
judgmen t s after  power of sale foreclosur e.114 Moreover , some
ju r isdict ion s app ly “fa ir  va lu e” leg is la t ion  tha t  su bs t it u tes  for
the tr adit ional deficiency measu rem ent , the difference between
the mor tga ge obligat ion an d t he “fair value” of the foreclosed
rea l esta te. 115 I ndeed , t he R estat em ent ad opts  th e lat ter  fair
va lu e limit a t ion .116
The contr act  for deed ven dor lik ewise  faces  the  substan t i a l
equ iva len t  of an t ideficien cy leg is la t ion ; this  is t he ca se even  in
the overwh elmin g ma jority  of sta tes t ha t h ave not en acted
de ficiency judgment prohibitions in the pur ch ase money
mor tgage conte xt.  To t he extent that  a jurisdiction validates the
for feit u re r em ed y, t he e lect ion  of rem edies doctrine,  a ju dicially
crea t ed concept , p r oh ibit s t he  vend or from  re coverin g th e
mor tgage equ ivale nt  of a deficiency ju dgm en t .117 Con side r , for
examp le, the followin g h ypothet ica l. Supp ose tha t a  pur chaser
defau lt s on  a  con t r act  for deed th at  ha s a cur ren t ba lance of
$75,000 and t ha t  the ve ndor  va lid ly in vokes  the forfeit u re
remedy. After regaining the land, the vendor discovers  th at  it is
wor th  only $50,000. Becau se of th e election of remedies
doct r ine, the ve ndor  is  ba r red  from collect in g fr om the
pur chaser  the d iffer en ce bet ween  the con t ract  balan ce ($75,000)
and the  fa i r  marke t  va lue of the  land ($50 ,00 0). This will be the
case eve n  wh er e t he p urchase r ’s con t ract  obligat ion is
rep res en ted  by a  se pa ra te p romissor y note.118 Moreover , a  p r ior
use of the for feit u re r em ed y h as b een  held  to ba r  an  act ion
against  t he  pu rchaser  for  wast e119 or  for  reim bursemen t  for
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mon eys expended by t he vend or to pay rea l esta te t axes.1 2 0 On
the oth er h an d, wh ere  a ven dor es chews  forfeitu re a nd  obta ins
a  de cree  for  sp ecifi c pe r formance, t he e lect ion  doct r ine will  not
bar him or her from sa t i sfyin g t he d ecr ee  out  of the con t ract
rea l esta te a nd oth er a sset s of th e pur chaser .121
To be su re, cour ts  an d legis l a tu re s som et ime s em ploy a
variet y of mea sures to ameli ora te t he h arsh nes s of t he e lect ion
of rem edies doctrine. For exa m ple, some courts distinguish
between  note s g iven  a s  pa r t  of t he  con t r act  “downpaymen t” and
those tha t  finance th e ba lan ce of th e pu rch as e pr ice. Und er t his
approach , the former t ype sur v ive the  t ermina t ion  of the
cont ract  an d ar e enforceable while the election doctrine ba rs
any act ion  on  the  la t t e r .122 An Ohio stat ute provides tha t  even
though  a  contr act for deed has been canceled, an awa rd for
dam ages  ma y be enter ed aga inst  th e pur chaser  if the lat ter
“has pa id  an  amount  l ess  than  the fa ir r ent al va lue p lus
det erior at ion or de st ru ction of th e pr oper ty occasion ed by t he
[purchaser’s] us e.”123 Moreover , t he Mich iga n  Su pr em e Cour t
has he ld  t h a t , “while the [vendor] may not accept or take
posses sion and  st ill seek m oney dam ages, he m ay, even after
send ing not ice  of for fe itu re , r e fuse  t en der  of possess ion  and
eith er  commence an action for money damages or  for
foreclosur e of th e la nd  contr act .”124
Notwiths tand ing the  foregoing ameliorat ive measur es,
however, wher e t he la nd i s w or th  les s t han  the con t ract
obliga t ion , a  vendor  con templa t ing for fe itu re  faces  a  subs tan t ia l
ele ct ion  of rem edies dilemma . On th e other  han d, his or her
under secu red mor tga gee count erp ar t d oes not  face a s imila r
qu an da ry.  Unless  th e for eclos ure is  to take  place in  one  of th e
few ju r isdict ion s t h a t p roh ibit d eficiency judgm ent s in  th e
purchase money m or tga ge con text , t he for eclos in g m or t g a gee
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will be able t o obta in  a  de ficiency ju dgmen t  aga in st  anyon e
pe rson a lly  lia ble  on the m or tga ge ob liga t ion .
VI. TH E  R E S T AT E M EN T  AP P R O A C H : TH E  CO R E  CO N C E P T
 Thus far we h ave seen  tha t  an  in crea sing n umber  of cour t s
and leg is la tu res  have b een  focus ing on  th e cont ra ct for deed
and its  forfeitu re  clau se wit h a  mor tga ge law  analogy in mind.
Indeed, to the ext ent  th at  a d iscern able  judicia l tr end  exist s, it
favor s char acte r iz ing  the con t ract  for  deed as  a  mor tgage .125
H owever, th is  pr oces s h as h ardly produ ced  an  ana lyt ica l or
pract i ca l consen sus . While forfeitures  ar e sometim es en forced,
reli ance on th e forfeitu re p rovision in  jur isdict ions  tha t  have
not  institutionalized it by sta t u te  is  hazardous  a t  bes t . What
one commenta tor  obse rved over  t h ree decades  ago i s s t il l ap t :
“Not  only does the la w va ry fr om ju r isdict ion  to jurisdiction, but
with in  any one  st a t e  r esu lt s  may vary depending upon the type
of act ion  b rough t , t he  exact  t e rms of the la nd  con t ract ,  and the
fact s of t he  pa r t icula r  case .”126 Th e in ter play of t hes e va r iou s
factors mak e s i t  ext rem ely  di fficu lt  to pr ed ict  wh et her  a  cour t
wil l permi t for fe itu re  of a  pu rchaser ’s  in t e res t .
The vendor’s nonforfeitur e rem edies ar e a lso pr oblema tic.
While specific perform an ce is often a vailable, other r emedies
such  as da ma ges and foreclosure are less predicta ble. Moreover,
obstacles like th e election of remedies doctrin e pr esent  furt her
compl ica t ion s for  the ven dor .127 As  a  resu lt ,  the contr act vendor
is ha rdly as sur ed of a pre dicta ble an d efficient fin an cing device.
The con t r act  for  deed , if anyt hin g, can be  mor e pr oblema tic
for  th e p u r ch a s er . To be sure, we have seen that courts and
legislatu res  ha ve placed significan t r estr ictions on forfeitures .
But  forfeit u res  do ha ppen  an d t his  can  become esp ecially
burdensome on th e pu rch as er w her e his  or he r eq uit y is
su bst an tia l. For exam ple, we saw th at  th e default ing pur chaser
in  Ru ssell v. Richards forfeite d a  su bst an tia l equ ity t o t he
ven dor  because she was un able to tender  t h e con t ract
balan ce.128 Ha d t he ven dor bee n r equ ired to foreclose by pu blic
sale, the pur chaser  ar guably would ha ve been able t o recover at
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least some por t ion  of her  equ it y. We  now t urn  our  a t t en t ion  to
h ow adoption of the R estat em ent will r esolve t he  foregoing a nd
related issues.
A. T he Cont ract for Deed  is a M ortgage
 The Restatem en t  t a k e s t h e unambiguous  pos it ion  tha t  “[a ]
con t r act  for  deed  crea te s a  mor tga ge.”129 This  mea ns  th at  it will
be “govern ed pr oced ura lly  and s ubs tan t ive ly by t he la w of
mor t g a ges.”130 This  core idea  is r eflected in  th e following
illust ra t ion :
Ven dor  a n d  P u r ch a s e r  en t e r  in t o a  co n tr a c t  t o  sell
Bla cka cre  for $ 50,0 00. P u rch as er  m ak es  a d own  pa ym en t of
$5 ,000 an d a gr ees  to p ay  th e ba lan ce in  five equ al a nn ua l
ins ta llm en t s  of $9,0 00 p lu s in te re st  at  10 p er cen t. U pon
s a t is fa ct or y com ple tion  of th is ob liga tion , th e con tr act  call s for
de l ive ry by Ve n dor  to P u r c h a s e r  o f a  d e e d  t o  t h e  p r e m i s e s . I f
Pu rchase r  d e fa u l t s , t h e  co n t r a ct  g iv e s V en d o r  t he  r igh t  t o
t e r m i n a t e t h e  con t r a ct  a n d  to  re ta in  p r io r  pa ymen ts  by
Pu rchase r  as  l iquid at ed da ma ges.  Pu rcha ser  h as  t he r ight  t o
posses sion  du r ing  the  p r e -conveyance  pe r iod .  Pu rchase r
d e fa u l t s on  the  f i r s t  an nu a l  i n s t a l lmen t  an d  Vendor  dec la re s  a
te rm in at ion  o f t h e  c on t r a c t . T w o m on th s  l a t e r ,  Pu r chase r
t e n d e r s  t o  the  Vendor  $45 ,000 , t he  con t r a c t  ba l ance ,  t oge the r
w i t h a c cr u e d  i n t er e s t . V en d o r  d oe s  n ot  for eclos e t h e con tr a ct
a s  a  m o rt ga g e. F or fe itu re  is u ne nfor cea ble. Th e r ede m pt ion is
effect ive  an d  Vendor  wi l l  be r equ i r ed  to  de l ive r  t o  Pur chase r  a
deed  to  the  p r emises .131
Supp ose, however , tha t  the  purchaser  i s e ithe r  unable or
unwil ling to come u p with  th e $45,000. The R estat em ent ma kes
it  cl ea r  tha t  the  purchaser  has  t he r igh t  to force t he ve ndor  to
foreclos e th e cont ra ct as a  mort gage.132 Equa lly impor tan t ,  the
purchaser ’s r i gh t s  in  t he  foregoing set t in gs  do n ot  de pe nd u pon
whet her  su bst an tia l con t r a ct pa yment s ha ve been ma de.
Indeed, th e pur chaser  in th e above il lustr a t ion  has  the r igh t  t o
redeem  or  in si st  upon  for e closure even  wh er e m in im al or  no
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paymen t s were m ade on  the  con t r act .133 As  the commenta ry to
the R estat em ent stresses, a  con t r a ry approach  would mean  tha t
[p]re dict ab ility  wou ld be  sa crificed in  e a ch  c a s e t o t h e  n e e d  f or
a  cou r t  t o  m ake  a  de t e rm ina t ion  o f  whe the r  t he  pu rchase r ’s
fi n a n ci a l s ta ke in  th e pr opert y is  suff icient  to  just i fy  m ortga ge
t r e a t m e n t . Moreove r ,  because  s om e  con t r a ct s  wou ld  con t in u e
t o be su bject  to  forfei tu re  a nd  th e ap pl icat ion of  non-m ortga ge
la w , c ou r t s  w ou l d  be  co n fr o n t e d w i t h  t h e  u n fo r t u n a t e  n e ed  t o
m a i n t a in  two  sepa ra t e  an d  d i s t inc t  bod ie s  of law  gover nin g
secur i ty  in t e re s t s  i n  r ea l  e s t a t e . 134
B. Att em pt s t o Va ry  Mortgage T rea tm ent by A greem ent of
Parties
 To wha t  ex ten t  will an agr eemen t by the  pa r t i es  to va ry the
above resu lts be enforceable? Sta ted a nother  way, to wha t
extent  will an ad vance waiver by t he pu rcha ser of his or her
red emp tion  or foreclosur e righ ts  be effective? Her e aga in t he
mor tgage tr eat men t is complete. “[T]he pa rt ies a r e permi tt ed to
vary [the r es u lt  rea ched  by m or tga ge l aw] on ly t o the ext en t
tha t  pa r t ie s t o a  norma l mor tgage tr ansa ction are so
em power ed.”135 Con side r  the im pa ct  of the la t ter  pr in ciple on  a
common vendor ta ctic—th e deed in es crow. Un der  th is
p r ocedur e, th e pu rch as er is  req uir ed a t t he t ime of execut ing
the con t r act  for deed  to deliver to an es crow agent a n executed
quit claim  deed to rea l estat e. In th e even t of pur cha ser  defau lt,
the ven dor  not ifie s t he escr ow agen t  and  the l at t e r , pu r suan t  t o
the e scrow a r r angement , records  the d eed.  In  a  va r ia t ion  on
th i s approach, the vendor, rat her th an an  escrow agent, holds
the quitclaim  deed an d records it a fter t he p u rcha ser ’s defa ult .
In  th e ven dor’s idea l world , th e recording of th e quitclaim d eed
will ha ve the effect  of t e rmina t ing the  purchaser ’s  con t ract
interest.136 However , under  th e R estat em ent approach ,  the
ven dor ’s exp ect a t ion s w ill  be  de fea ted . Unde r  a  t r adi t ion a l
mor tgage law ap proach, if a mort gagor delivers a deed  t o the
mort gaged p remises  to an  escrow agent  or th e mort gagee,
con temporaneous wit h  the execu t ion  of t he m ortgage, th e deed
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will be charact e r ized  as a n  in va lid  clog on  the m or tga gor ’s
equ i ty of redempt ion .137 Because t he R estat em ent t r ea t s the
con t ract  for  deed as a mortgage and the purchaser a s the  holder
of the equ it y of r ed em pt ion , “th e u se  of a contemporaneous deed
in  th e cont ra ct for de ed s et tin g s h ou ld likewise be
ine ffective.”138
C. Effect on Oth er Vend or Remedies
 We saw earl ier  in this  Art icle  tha t , in  lieu  of forfeitur e,
con t ract  for  deed vendors  ma y be able to utilize other  rem edies
against  t he  de fau lt i ng  pu rchaser .139 These  include  act ions for
specific p er forma nce, dam ages, an d foreclosure.140 These
remedies, as su ch, are u na vailable un der t he R estat em ent
approach . Neve rt he less , fu n ctionally equivalent r emedies are
ava ilable  under t he law of mortgages. A mor tga gee nor ma lly
has th e right  to defer  or  forego for eclos ure a nd s ue on  the
mor tgage obliga t ion .141 Similar ly, under  th e R estat em ent
approach  a contr act vendor , qua  mort gagee, will be able to
obta in  a remedy that  differs only sema nt ica lly  from an  act ion
for specific performa nce for t he pr ice.
M or e ov er , t o  t he  ex ten t  t ha t  a  de f i ci ency  judgm en t  is  ava i lab le
t o a  m or tgagee  wher e  the  fo rec losu re  sa l e  y i e lds  l e s s  t h a n  t h e
m o r tg a ge  obliga tion , so t o o w i ll  su c h  a  ju d g m e n t  b e  gr a n t e d  t o
t h e co n tr a ct  v en d or  a ft e r  a fore closur e sa le pr odu ces sim ilar
r e su lt s .  Th is m ort ga ge r em ed y n ot on ly a fford s t h e ve n dor  a
p r a ct ica l su bs tit u te  for a  con tr a ct  ac t ion  fo r  dam ages ,  bu t  a l so
g ives the  ven dor  the  a dvan t age  o f no t  ha v ing  to  p rove  the  fa ir
ma rke t  va lue  of th e  re al e st at e, a s w ould  be r equ ire d in  an
ac t ion  fo r  dam ages .142
An impor t an t  caveat is necessar y at t his point . There is a
dan ger th at  one might  be misled int o believing  tha t  the
R estat em ent endorses or even contemplates the  cont in ued  use  of
the contr act  for deed, a lbeit gover ned  by mor tga ge law
pr inciples. Th is  wou ld  be a  clea r  mis in ter pr et a t ion  of th e
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R estat em ent’s fundamen ta l pu rpose—to e limina te the  use  of the
cont r a ct  for  deed as a land finan cing device. By treating it  as a
mort gage, the R estat em ent seek s t o rem ove an y incen tive  for its
con t inued use by lan d seller s. Ult ima tely, t his  Art icle will
demons t r a t e tha t  st ru ctu rin g lan d fina ncin g tr an sa ctions  solely
with in  the  norms of tr ad itiona l mor tga ge law n ot only ben efits
bot h  ven dor s an d pur chaser s, but , equally import an t, decrea ses
confusion  an d increa ses efficiency for court s an d pra ctitioners
alike.
VII. TH E  R E S T AT E M EN T : IM P A CT  O N  OT H E R  IM P O R T A N T  IS S U E S
 The cont inued  use of the contr act  for deed as a  lan d
fina ncin g device ra ises other  serious problems for both parties.
I t s use can cause  subst an tial t itle problems for both pu rcha ser
and vend or a like. P ur cha ser  ban kr up tcy filings a lso r aise
thorny  is sues . The rights of judgmen t credit ors an d mort gagees
of both pa rt ies ar e concep t ua lly cloude d a nd oft en
un pred ictable. The bala nce of th is Article explores these
remain ing problems. It  will conclude tha t  the best  way t o avoid
these problems is by elimina ting t he contr act for deed a s a
financing device.
A. T it le Problem s for the Pu rch as er
 A con t ract  for  deed purchaser  confron t s  a  gr eat er  lik eli hood
of title pr oblems  than  does  h i s or  he r  coun te rpar t  in  the
st anda rd pu rch as e mon ey mor tga ge tr an sa ction. In  th e lat t er
sett ing, the cha nces ar e str ong tha t t he pu rcha ser  will exam ine
the vend or’s t itle in  order  to be a ssu red  of it s  mar ket ab ility.
Even  wher e th e pu rch as er fa ils t o ta ke t his  st ep, if a t hir d
pa r ty lender  is  in volve d in  the t r ansa ct ion , it  wil l in si st  upon  a
t i t le ins ur an ce policy or some  sim ilar  form of tit le a ssu ra nce. In
the con t ract  for  deed con text  the  chances  a re  st rong  tha t  the
ven dor ’s t it le w ill  not  be  exa min ed  wh en  the con t r act  i s
executed. Because t her e is norma lly no th ird  pa r ty l ender  t o
insist on  a  t i t le  examina t ion ,  th e vendor  has  no incen t ive to
h a ve h is  or  her  own  t it le e xa min ed . Mor eove r , m any con t ra ct
pu rch as ers  ha ve low incomes an d often  e ithe r  cannot  a fford  the
cost  of a  t it le e xa min a t ion  or  sim ply do not recognize th e need
for  it . Con se qu en t ly,  many con t ract  pu r ch a sers execut e th e
con t r act , take possession ,and m ak e substan tial payments on
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the con t ract  on ly to discover la ter  th at  th e vend or’s t itle is
encum bered  by mortga ges, judgment  liens,  or  other  pr econ t ract
interests.143
T h e pr oblem for t he p ur cha ser  in t he foregoin g sit ua tion  is
tha t  t he  vendor  need  not  ha ve  m arketa ble title until he or she
is requ ired  to deliver  th e deed . Thu s, wh ile th e pu rch as er is
paying down  the con t r act ,  t he vendor is not obligated to
establish ma rk eta ble title an d th e pu r chas er ca nn ot wit hh old
per formance in  sp it e of su bstan tial title defects.144 The
pur chaser  mu st  re ly on  the ve ndor  be in g a ble  to correct  su ch
defect s pr ior to th e t ime the  la s t  con t r act  paymen t  must  be
ma de.
However,  supp ose the vend or’s tit le is not defective at th e
t ime the  con t r act  i s execu ted, but  becomes  so du rin g th e
amor t iza tion  period. Of course, if the p u r ch a ser records the
con t ract  when it is executed, there will be protection against
any su bseq ue nt  lien s or ot he r in te re st s a ris ing t h r ou gh  or
against  t he  vendor .145 However , man y uns ophisticat ed
purchaser s do not record and, as t his Article explores l a te r,
may actually be prevented from recording by t heir vendors.
“S ince vend ors a nt icipat e a h igh de fau lt  r a te  among vend ees, it
is i n t he  vendor s ’ i nt e res t  t ha t  the contracts not be recorded so
tha t  they m ay qu ick ly r es ell  to other  purchasers  withou t  the
necess ity of a  judicial proceeding to remove a tit le cloud posed
by a r ecorded  contr act .”146 Supp ose then  th at  after  execu t ing
the con t r act  for  de ed , t he ve ndor  eit her  mor tga ges  or  rese ll s the
land. While in  ma ny ju r isdict ion s th e fact t ha t t he p ur cha ser  is
in  pos se ss ion  rep res en t s t he fu nct ional equ ivalen t of record ing
and will const itu t e cons t ruct ive  not i ce  to those subsequen t ly
dea ling with the contr act land,147 t h i s i s not  invar iably the
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purchase r ’s mowing of grass a nd weeds insu fficient “visible, open, exclusive and
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151. S ee Nels on, supra  note 1, at  165.
case.148 Even  if posses sion p rovide s t he  re qu isit e const ru ctive
not ice,  pr oving th at  posses sion could be  difficult  an d r equ ire
lit i ga t ion .149 Cle ar ly,  pos se ss ion  is  ha rdly a  sa t is factory
subst itut e for t he cert aint y provided by a recorded document .
Note tha t  in  the  t r adi t iona l pur cha se m oney m ort gage
t r ansact ion  th is problem will not ar ise. A th ird pa rt y lender
will in si st  tha t  the deed t o the m or tga gor -pu r chaser  and  the
mor tgage be r ecorded  pr ompt ly in ord er t o prot ect it self aga ins t
any subsequ ent  inter ests  an d encum bra nces th at  later  ma y
arise aga in st  or  be  crea ted  by t he m or tga gor . In  the ve ndor
purchase mon ey sit ua tion , th e pu rch as er w ill usu ally r ecord h is
or  her  de ed . E ven  if t he p urchase r  fa ils  to do s o, t he ve ndor
knows th at  record ing is a lways  possible a nd  will inevit ably
recor d th e mor tga ge to pr otect a gain st  liens  or  othe r  in t e res t s
a r i sing ther ea fter  aga in st  the m or tga gor . In both situa tions, the
self-interest  of the len de r  a lso en su res  the p rotect ion  of th e
mor tgagor . This is so becau se th e recording by the m ortgagee
will pr otect  th e m ort gagor  aga ins t any subsequent inter ests
a r is ing th rough  or  aga ins t  t he vendor .
B. Title Problem s for Vendors
 Where  contra cts for deed a re h eavily regulat ed by sta tu te,
such  as in  Iowa  and M in nes ota , vendor s confront  relat ively few
t i t le problem s.  As t h is  Art icle  notes , s t a tu tory t er min a t ion
procedures  in s uch  st at es p rovide  a gen er ally e ffect ive
mechanism for est ablis h i ng record  tit le in t he ven dor even  if
the contr act is recorded.150 However ,  the situa t ion  i s
dra m a t ically di ffer en t  in  those  st a tes  wh er e t he con t ract  for
deed is governed solely or largely by case law. In those
jurisdictions, the contr act for deed “will provide . . . an efficient
and chea p m et hod of r ega in in g possession of th e contr act  lan d
and a m erch an ta ble t itle  only if the [purcha ser] fails complet ely
to as ser t h is r ight s.”151 In  other words, only if th e defa ult ing
pur chaser  vacates th e premises without ha ving recorded the
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commit s th e tor t of slan der on  tit le by emp loying th e above recordin g met hods . S ee
id . at  166; see also Rid gew ood U ti ls.  Cor p. v . Ki ng , 42 6 S o. 2d  49 (F la . Di st . Ct . App.
1982) (holding where recorded contra ct for deed was not entitled to  be recorded
because un ack now led ged  by t he  ven dor , t he  ven dor  ha d n o cau se of a ction for sland er
of title whe re th ere was  no showing th e contract, a s recorded, wa s false and  tha t  t he
ven dor  was  dam aged  by th e re cordin g). 
con t ract  will th e vend or be a ble to r esell  t he  proper ty to a
pers on who will probably qualify as a bona fide pur chaser .
However , th e vendor will be faced with  su bst an tia l tit le
p rob lems if, either  before or  aft er  defa ult , th e purchaser records
the contr act . Even  if forfeit ur e is in fact valid in a given
s itua t ion , it will t ak e a ju dicial p r oceeding to ma ke th at
det erm ina tion  an d esta blish ma rk eta ble t i t le  in  t he  vendor .
S u r ely, a  se lf-ser vin g a ffidavit  from the ve ndor  a lon e will  not
su ffice to accomplish th at r esult. As I n ote d t wo decad es a go,
“the vend or is faced  with  th e costly pr ospect of a qu iet t itle
act ion  or  some  othe r  jud icial pr oceeding t o rega in a  ma rk eta ble
t i t le. The [purchas er], for settlem ent p ur poses, may very well
be ab le  to demand  much  more  than  wha t  he has  inves ted in  the
pr oper ty a s t he  pr ice for a qu it-claim  deed .”152
As a  resu lt ,  vendors frequ ent ly att empt  to prevent  th e
record ing of th e con t r act . They seek t o accomplish t his r esult  by
omi t t ing an  acknowledgm ent of the par ties’ signat ures.
H owever, a p ur cha ser  often over comes t his  obsta cle by
execut ing an d recording an  affidavit th at  eit her  refe r s t o the
con t r a ct  or its  esse nt ial t erm s. Som etim es t he cont ra ct will
sim ply be a t t a ch ed to th e affidavit as a n exhibit. Su ppose,
however, tha t  st a tu tes  pr ohibi t  the r ecor ding of a ffidavit s or
land contr acts, as is the case in a few stat es.153 The pu rchaser ’s
response may simply be to record an a cknowledged assignment
of the pur chaser’s int eres t  to a  s t raw par ty together  wi th  a
reass ignmen t  t o the  pu rchaser .154
Some vendor s , h owever , go to even gr eat er le ngt hs  to a void
record ing by th e pu rch as er. Th is hostility to recording t ak es the
form of a  contract  for  deed provis ion that  makes r ecor ding a
ground for d efa u lt  an d forfeitur e. Such pr ovisions ma y very
well violat e t he  pu blic policy un der lying t he  re cordin g acts,
which  gener ally en coura ges t he r ecordin g of int er es t s in  rea l
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esta te.  As Professor  Wa r ren  apt ly n oted , it  is  un lik ely  tha t  su ch
provis ion s will be effective “to at ta in an ythin g more th an  th e
host ility of the judge who has to int er pr et  th e cont ra ct.”155
Nevertheless, th e in  terrorum effect of su ch pr ovisions m ay we ll
discour age th e recording of cont ra cts by ma ny pu rcha sers .
What are th e practical implications of th e foregoing for  a
vendor  in  a  s t a te  tha t  has not legislatively institutionalized the
con t ract  for deed? Sometimes I suggest t o my studen ts  tha t  the
con t ract  for  de ed  can  pot en t ia lly  be  a  “pr opu rchaser” financing
device, at least  in  si tua t ions  where the  con t ract  i s r ecorded  and
the pur chaser  has minim al equit y in th e propert y. Moreover,
wher e t he cont ra ct for deed is p ervas ively used in  low income,
low down payment  situations, mass r ecord ing of t hose con t r act s
“could increas e th e [purcha sers ’] practical economic inter ests  in
the involved rea l esta te a nd  possib ly res ult  in pe rva sive t itle
clouds  on  subs t an t ia l  amoun t s  of t ha t  r ea l  e st a t e .”156
Note that  where the vendor  uses  a mortgage or deed of trust
as the fin an cing device an d th e jurisdiction ha s an  efficient
power of sa le for eclos ure p rocess,  the r out in e u se  of th e
n on judicia l process will terminate th e purchaser’s interest.
Assuming th is pr ocedur e is va lidly con d u cted , th e vend or will
not  be required, as in the recorded contr act  for deed  conte xt, t o
use the  jud icia l pr ocess t o est ab lish  ma rk et ab le t itle . Thu s, t he
pur chaser  will not be able to “ext or t” mon ey fr om the  vendor  for
the delivery of a quitclaim deed.
C. Pu rch as er B an kru pt cy: T he “Execu tory Contr act ” Problem
 A bankrup tcy filing by a contra ct for deed p ur chaser  ra ises
a  substant ial problem that does not exist when the bankru pt
pur chaser  i s a  mor t gagor  in  a  s t andard mor tgage  t ransact ion .
This  is  because  of sect ion  365 of t he Bankrupt cy Cod e wh ich
provides for  the  “assumpt ion” or  “re ject ion” of any “execu tory
con t r a ct ” of the d ebtor .157 For exam ple, assu me t ha t five years
ago a  vend or a nd  pu rch as er e xecut e a cont ra ct for deed  with  a
$100,000 purchase pr ice paya ble over  t en  years  in  equa l annua l
in s t a llments.  Su pp ose  tha t  the purchase r  de fau lt s on  the fift h
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161. S ee RE A L E S T AT E  F I N AN C E  LAW , supra  note 1, at  666.
payment and fi les  a  ba nkrupt cy pet it ion  befor e the vendor
ta kes  an y action to seek forfeitu re or oth er  stat e law remedies.
If the con t ract  for  de ed  is  t r ea ted  as a n  “execu tor y con t r act ”
un der  se ct ion  365(a ) of the Bankrupt cy Cod e, t he ve ndor  m ay
compel  th e pu r ch a ser -de bt or  to ass ume or  reject  the con t ract .
In  th e cas e of an  as su mp tion , sect ion  365(b) requires the
pur chaser  to cure th e default , compen sat e th e vendor  for  any
dam ages  caused by t he defau lt, an d provide adequ at e
assurance of fu tu re  per form ance  of t he  con t r act .158 I f the
pur chaser  is un able to sa tisfy thes e r equir em en ts,  the con t ract
will be t r ea te d a s  r ejected a nd t he pu rcha ser will lose the
land.159 If the valu e of th e land  exceeds the contr act ba lance,
the ven dor  wil l ga in  tha t  su rplus.  Con ver se ly,  if t he con t ract  for
deed is t re at ed a s a  mor tga ge or s ecur ity interest ,  r a the r  than
as an  “execu tory con t ract , ” the  vendor  may  not  invoke  the
foregoing Ban kr up tcy Code sect ions a nd  will be treat ed as a
mort gagee in the bankr uptcy proceedin g .1 6 0 Accordin gly, th e
ven dor  wil l be  en t it led  only t o the con t ract  balan ce ra the r  than
the land. Thus, if the land is  sold a t  a  bankrup tcy  sa le and  the
sa le price exceeds th e cont ra ct balan ce, the pur chaser ’s
un secured  creditors, ra th er t h a n  th e vendor, will be the
beneficiaries.
Whether t he  con t r act  for  deed will be tr ea te d a s a  mor tga ge
or  securit y device ra th er t ha n  a n  execu tory  con t r act  a s sumes
even more im por tance in  the bankrupt cy r eor ga niza t ion
con text . In tha t setting, if the contr act is char acterized as a
mor tgage, i t  can  be made par t  of the  reorgan iza t ion  p lan  and
enhance th e odds t ha t t he p lan will su cceed. For  exam ple, a
fa rmer -deb tor  in  a  Chapter  12 r eorgan iza t ion  may be ab le  to
reduce th e cont ra ct balan ce to the land’s cur ren t  market  va lue
and ha ve an y excess over t ha t va lue d ischa rged  aft er m ak ing
modest plan payments.161 If, on  th e other  hand , t he  cour t  t r ea t s
the con t ract  a s  “execu tory” and th e pu rch as er-de btor  (debt or-in-
possession ) is un able to cure t he defau lt an d compen sat e th e
ven dor  for da ma ges ca us ed by t h e  de fa u lt, t he la nd  in a ll
lik eli hood will be  for feit ed  to the ve ndor  and t he ch ances  for  a
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Properties, Inc., 979  F.2 d 13 58 (9t h C ir . 199 2); In re Terrell, 892 F.2d 4 69 (6th C ir.
198 9); In re S peck , 798  F. 2d  279  (8th  Cir . 198 6); In re Jones,  186 B.R.  71 (Bankr .
W.D. Ky. 1 995); In re Miskowsk i, 182 B.R. 5 (Bank r. M.D. Pa. 1995). For  cases
favoring  th e “mort gage or  secur ity de vice” appr oach, s ee, e.g.,  I n  re Stre ets & Beard
Farm  Partnership , 882  F.2 d 23 3 (7t h C ir . 198 9); In re Hew ard  Br os., 210 B.R. 475
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199 1); In re Kratz, 96 B.R. 127 (Bank r. D . Oh io 198 8); In re Boot h , 19 B.R. 53
(Bankr . D. Ut ah  1982). See also, J u l i et  M. Morin giello, A M ort gag e by A ny  Ot her
N am e: A P lea f or t he U n if or m  T reatment of Installment Land  Contracts and
Mor tga ges Under  the Bankrup tcy  Code, 100 DICK. L. RE V. 733 (199 6).
163. Ver non  C ou n t r ym a n, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MI N N .
L. RE V. 439 , 46 0 (19 73).
164. Shaw v. Dawson, 48 B.R. 857, 860 (Bank r. D. N.M. 1985); cf. In re S t r eet s
& Beard Fa rm P artn ership, 882 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding t ha t deli ver y of
le g a l tit le is  a m er e for ma lit y an d doe s n ot r epr ese nt  th e k ind  of lega l oblig at ion t ha t
r ender s a co nt ra ct “e xecu tor y”).
165. S ee Sh aw , 48 B.R. at 862.
successfu l reor gan izat ion will be su bst an tia lly dimin ish ed, if
not  destroyed. This may especially be  the case where  the
con t ract  rea l est a te is  the p urchase r -de bt or ’s s ole or  major
as set . “Execu tory” t rea tment  may  well  mean  l iqu ida t ion ,  r a ther
than  r eorgan iza t ion , of t he  pu rchaser -deb tor .
Cour t s ar e sh ar ply divided  on th is “mort gage or  secur ity
de vice  vs. execut ory cont ra ct” quest ion ,  a lthough  the cases
favor  sligh t ly the “exe cutory” cha racter iza t ion .162 Court s often
rely  on  P rofessor  Coun t rym an’s d efin it ion  of an  exe cutory
con t ract  as one “under  which th e obliga t ion  of bot h  the
bankru pt  and  the other  pa r ty  to the  con t ract  a re  so fa r
unper for m e d tha t  the fa ilu re of e it her  to complet e p er formance
would  cons t itu te  a  mater ia l b reach  excusin g th e performa nce of
the othe r .”163 In  app ly ing th i s defin it ion  to the  con t ract  for deed,
one federal court stat ed that
t h e ob liga t ion  o f t he  [pu r chase r ]  to  pa y  th e pu rch as e pr ice
accor din g t o  t h e t e r m s  of t h e  co n t r a ct ,  a n d  t h e obliga tion  of th e
[ven dor ] t o  de l ive r  t i t l e  t o  the  [pu rchase r ]  when  fu l l  paymen t
h a s  been  m ade ,  a r e  bo th  u npe r form ed .  Fa i lu re  o f  e ithe r  p a r t y
t o  co m p le t e pe r fo rman ce  wou ld  cons t i t u t e  a  m a t e r ia l b r ea ch  of
t h e  co n t r a ct .164
In  addition, the court  indicated th at  mort gage or se cur it y devi ce
t rea tment  of cont ra cts for d eed is  jus tified  only t o t h e extent
tha t  stat e law treats th em as such in other contexts.165 Und er
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167. S ee DAVID G. E P S T E IN , BANKRUPTCY AND OTHER DEBTOR -CREDITOR LAWS 42-
47 (199 5).
168. S ee id . at 43.
169. S ee i d .
th i s view, bankrup tcy cour ts  in F lorida , In dia na , Ken tu cky,
New York , and  Oklahoma,  where cont ra cts for d eed r eceive
mor tgage t rea tment ,  wi ll  r each  a  di fferen t r esult  th an  in New
Me xico,  wher e  co u r t s  h a v e  n o t  a d o p t e d  su ch  a
characte r iza t ion .166
What ever else it  is, t he  con t ract  for deed is  a la nd  fina ncin g
de vice  tha t  funct ions  economica lly as a  pur chase m oney
mort gage. Sur ely this common economic funct ion ,  r a ther  than
sem an tic dist inct ions a bout  th e m ea nin g of “execut ory,” should
govern  whet her  t he  vendor , pu rchaser , or  t he  la t t e r ’s  unsecured
cred it ors rea p th e benefit of th e cont r act  lan d’s excess va lue in
the ban kr upt cy context. Th e R estat em ent ap pr oach can  aid  th is
process in two ways. F irst , one would h ope tha t in in ter pret ing
section  365 of t he Bankrupt cy Cod e, b ankrupt cy cou r t s w ill  look
to the R estat em ent for  suppor t  in  cha ract e r iz ing the  con t r act  for
deed as a  securit y device ra th er  t h an  an  execu tory  con t r act .
Second, sta te cou r t  adoption of th e R estat em ent ap pr oach will
pr obably ensu re t h a t  bankruptcy  cour t s  s it t ing in  tha t  s t a te
will t r ea t  t he  con t r act  for  deed as  a m ortgage or  se cur it y devi ce
for section 365 pu rposes.
D. J ud gment s Against  Contract for Deed Parties.
 In  virt ua lly ever y st at e, a  judgmen t  crea tes  a  lien  on the
rea l property of the judgment debt or .1 6 7 The mechan ics of
obta inin g th e lien a nd  whe n it  becomes  effective vary  from s t a t e
to sta te. In s ome st a tes , t he li en  a r ises  upon  en t ry of the
judgment upon a l l rea l est at e of the ju dgm ent  debt or in t he
coun ty in which the judgment is obtained.168  I n  ma ny other
jurisdictions, th is lien is creat ed when  the judgmen t is docketed
(enter ed by a  cler k i n  an  app ropr ia te docke t  book ).169
Nevertheless, th e foregoing differen ces ar e min or  and, as a
pract i ca l ma tt er, a jud gment  creditor is able t o obta in a lien
against  th e deb t or ’s rea l esta te a lmost imm ediat ely after t he
en t ry of th e judgmen t. Moreover, the effective dat e of th e lien
un der  th e foregoing st an da rd s a lso det erm ines  its  pr ior i ty  as
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against  other  judgmen t liens on t he r eal est at e. Thu s, if t he
holder  of the senior judgment lien forecloses first,  it  will wipe
out  th e jun ior jud gmen t lien . If th e lat ter  forecloses fir s t , the
sa le will b e sub ject  to t he  seni or ju dgment  lien. On th e other
han d, the ju dgmen t  cred it or  is  not  as for tun at e with  r e spect  t o
the de bt or ’s p er son a l prope r ty. N ormally th e cred itor  will
proceed by a writ  of execution an d no lien a rises as against
deb tor ’s pe r son a l prope r ty u n t il t he s her iff a ctua lly  lev ies  on
it. 170 As  a  p ract i ca l  matt e r , the  fi r st  credi tor  to have an
exe cut ion  sa le s ell s t he p rope r ty fr ee  and cle a r  of th e claim s of
other judgmen t credit ors. Consequen tly, where t he judgm ent
deb tor  is either  a  pu rchase r  or  ven dor  unde r  a  cont ract  for
deed, det erm inin g whe th er t he d ebt or’s in ter est  is r ealt y or
per son a lt y can  be crucia l in  de termin ing  the r igh t s  of the
judgmen t  cred it or .
Cour t s ha ve ha d n o difficult y in d ea ling w i t h  the rights of
the purchaser ’s  judgment cr editor. Most sta tes hold tha t th e
purchaser’s interest is real estate  for  pu rposes  of judgmen t  li en
sta tu tes  and  tha t  t he  judgment  creditor of the purchaser
acquires  a  li en  on  the  la t t e r ’s  in t e res t  fr om the  da te  the
judgment is docketed.171 Cour ts  us e t wo th eories  to jus tify t h is
resul t. Some em ploy the equit able conversion concept. Un der
th i s approach , from the  t ime  the con t r act  for  deed is executed,
the purchaser ’s  in t erest in equity is “converted” to real estate
while  the vendor’s rete nt ion of lega l tit le a nd  th e r ight  to
r ece ive the rema inder of the pur chase price is char acterized as
per sona lty. 172 Alterna tively, oth er court s simp ly conclude tha t
the legislatur e i n t en ded to tr eat  th e cont ra ct for deed
purchaser ’s inter est a s rea l esta te. 173  This “legislative int ent ”
approach  is favored by t hese court s because of a genera l
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as Security for a Debt: Er ickson  v. S e a t t le  Trus t  & Savings  Bank (In re Fr ee bor n),
47 MO . L. RE V. 328 , 33 0-31  (198 2).
176. S ee Tru eblood, supra  note 175, at  331.
177. S ee Snow Bros .  Hardware Co. v. Ellis, 21 S.W.2d  162 (Ark. 1929); Hu ll v.
Maryland Casua lty Co., 79 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1954); Bank of Haw. v. Horwoth, 787
P.2d 674 (Haw. 1990); Marks v. Tucum cari, 595 P .2d  119 9 (N .M. 1979); Cann efax v.
C lemen t , 818 P.2d 546 (Uta h 1991); Mueller v. Novelty Dye Works , 78 N.W.2d 881
(Wis. 195 6).
178. S ee Mar ks v. T ucu mca ri, 595  P.2d  1199 (N.M. 1 979); Muelle r v. N ovelty Dye
Works, 78 N .W.2 d 8 81 (W is.  195 6).
179. S ee Tru eblood, supra note 175.
180. S ee Ca nn efa x v. C lem en t,  818  P. 2d  546  (Ut ah  199 1).
uneasiness  with equ itable conversi on  an d it s im plicat ions in
such oth er a rea s as w ills and t ru sts  an d devolution at  deat h. 174
On the  other  hand, cour ts  ha ve exper ienced s ubs ta nt ial
difficulty in dea ling with t he judgm ent  creditor of the vendor .
Tr ad ition ally,  a  subs t an t ia l  n umber  of cour t s  have  t rea ted the
ven dor ’s contr act interest as r e a l estate for purposes of
judgment lien legisla t ion .175 Un de r  th is  app roach , t he ve ndor ’s
interest  is  rea l es ta te beca use  he or  sh e r et a in s lega l t it le t o the
land un t i l the  con t ract  is fully paid and th e deed is delivered to
the pu rchaser .176 Pe rhaps t he rea l bas is for th is view is
intu itive. Vendors often fin d ps ychological s ecur ity in  th e
cont r a ct  for deed becau se th ey believe th at  th ey “get to keep
t itle  to th e land ” un til th e last  paym ent  is ma de. In oth er
words, the average vendor sur ely believes his or  he r  in t e res t  is
rea l e st a t e  r athe r  t han  s imply t he r igh t  to rece ive  a  st r ea m of
payments.  Thu s, in a  cert ain  sen se, t he t ra dit iona l ap pr oach is
consistent with th e expectat ions of man y vendors.
However , a gr owing n um ber  of jur isdict ions ch ar act er ize the
ven dor ’s inter est a s pers onalty for pur poses of judgmen t  lien
stat utes.177 Som e u t ilize t he d oct r in e of equ it able  conver sion  to
reach  th e conclus ion t ha t t he  vend or’s in te re st  is pe rs ona lty. 178
A few take th e position tha t since the purchaser holds the r ea l
esta te,  th e ven dor’s int er est  logically mu st  be pe rs ona lty. 179
Fin ally,  som e cou r t s s im ply h old  tha t  the ve ndor ’s con t ract
r igh t s ar e persona lty because t ha t  r esu lt r eflects  legisla tive
in ten t .180
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181. S ee E PSTEIN , supra  note 167, at  49.
182. S ee STEF AN  A. RIESEN FELD , CREDITORS’ RE M E D I E S AND DEBTORS ’ P ROTECTION
166 (4t h e d. 1 987 ).
Consider  the  implica t ions  of the foregoing tw o app roa ches in
t h e cont ext of the following hypoth etical: A cont ra ct for deed
ven dor  i s e n titled to collect $50,000 over the n ext five year s.
Credit or A then  docket s a $20,000 judgmen t  against th e vendor
in  Boone Coun ty,  wh er e Bla ckacre, t he con t ract  land, is located.
Cr ed it or  B th en dockets a  $40,000 judgmen t  in  the  same
coun ty. Creditor B then h olds an  execu t ion  sa le  on  the
judgment and pur chases the vendor’s con t r act  i nt e res t  a t  the
sa le for $40,000. If we a re in  a sta te t ak ing  the t r ad it iona l
approach  that  the vendor’s interest  is  rea l es ta te, C red it or  B
pa id too much. Ea ch  cred it or  wou ld  have l ien s on  the ve ndor ’s
cont r a ct  inter est a nd t he pr iority of th eir judgmen ts would be
deter mined  by th e order of dock et in g. Conse qu en t ly,  since
Cr ed it or  B’s judgmen t  wa s d ocket ed  la ter  than  Cr ed it or  A’s,
Cr ed it or  B purchased subject to Creditor A’s unp a id $20,000
lien. If, on  th e other  hand,  the ju r isdict ion  t r ea t s t he ve ndor ’s
interest  as  per sona lty, Cr edit or B will be in  a bet ter  posit ion .
As per sona lty, t he ju dgm ent  credit or can  obta in n o lien in it
un t il it  is  levied upon  by t he s her iff pursu ant  to a  wr it  of
exe cut ion .181 The date of judgment docketing does not establish
pr iorit y; r a the r  the levy by th e sh eriff is t he cr ucia l point .
Cr ed it or  B’s execut ion sa le will sell vendor’s contr act interest,
a s persona lty, free and  clear  of t he  othe r  judgmen t  ir r e spect ive
of when it was docketed.
If th e R estat em ent governed th e foregoin g sit ua tion , th e
ven dor  would  inst ead be t re at ed a s a  mor tga gee. As su ch, t he
ven dor  would  hold no tit le, lega l or equ ita ble, bu t r at he r a  righ t
to receive the ba lance of th e obliga t ion  se cured  by a  lien  on
Blackacre.  Cons equ en tly, a s in  th ose jur isdict ions r ejectin g th e
t rad it iona l “rea l e sta te” approach ,  the vendor will be t r ea ted  as
owning persona l ty in  the same man ner as one who holds a
p romissory note s ecu red  by a  mor tga ge on  Blackacre. 182 In oth er
words, ad option  of th e R estat em ent would make i t  cl ea r  tha t  the
judgment creditor’s rights will not vary depending upon
whet her  his or her  debtor is a  vendor or a m ortgagee.
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183. S ee, e.g., Kendr ick v. Davis, 452 P.2d 222 (Wa sh . 19 69);  In re Jones , 186
B.R. 71 (Bankr . W.D. Ky. 1995); In re Willingha m, 139 B.R. 670  (Bank r. N.D . Ohio
199 1); Pet z v. Est at e of Pet z, 467 N.E.2d  780 (Ind. Ct . App. 1984); Stan na rd v.
Marboe, 198 N .W. 12 7 (Min n. 1 924); F inche r v. Miles Homes, In c., 549 S.W.2d 848
(Mo. 1977); O’Neill P rod. Cr edit  Ass’n v. M it che ll, 3 07 N .W.2 d 1 15 (N eb.  198 1);
Shindledecker  v. Sava ge, 627 P .2d 1241 (N .M. 1981 ); Butler  v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d
1244 (Ut ah  198 7); Di rk s v.  Cor nw ell , 75 4 P .2d  946  (Ut a h  C t . App. 1988). But see
Arkansas Su pp ly, I nc.  v. You ng , 58 0 S .W.2 d 1 74 (Ar k.  197 9).
184. S ee Erik son v. First  Nat ’l Bank, 697 P .2d 1332 (Mont. 1985); O’Neill Prod.
Cred it  Ass’n v. M itch ell, 3 07 N .W.2d  115 (N eb. 1 981); see also RE A L E S T AT E  F INANCE
LAW , supra  note 1, at  113.
185. S ee RE A L E S T AT E  F I N AN C E  LAW , supra note 1, §§ 7.11, .19.
E. Mortgaging the Purchaser’s and Vendor’s Interests
1. Mortgaging purchaser’s interest
 Bot h  pa y m en t  on  t h e  con t r a ct  ob li ga t ion  and incr eas ing
ma rk et  valu e of the la nd  incr e a ses th e value of the pu rcha ser’s
interest  as a n  econ omic a ss et . In de ed , we  have ju st  se en  how
cred it ors of t he  pu rchaser  a t t empt  to r each  th is  in t e res t . More
common ly, however, th e pu rch as er  seek s t o borr ow mon ey an d
use th is “equit y” as  secur ity for t he loa n. In deed , virt ua lly al l
cou r t s  re cognize t h a t  t h e p u r ch a s er ’s  in t e r es t  is
mort gageable.18 3  Fu nctionally, of cour se, th e pur chaser ’s lender
holds  th e economic equ iva len t  of a second mort gage because t he
ven dor ’s in teres t  i s ana logous  to a  fi r st  purchase money
mort gage.
Even  though the pu r cha ser’s int erest  is mort gageable,
lender s t o t h e  pu r chase r  a re oft en  unclea r  abou t  wh a t  type of
secu r it y documen t t o use. Some, for exam ple, tak e an
ass ignmen t  of th e pu rch as er’s inte res t t ogeth er w ith  a
quit claim  deed  from t he  pu rch as er . This  “pa cka ge” will be
t r eat e d a s a valid m ortgage, 184 but  becau se of th e pr obable
absence of a  pow er  of sa le,  it  wil l h ave t o be foreclosed
judicially, in a costly and  time-consum ing procedure. 185 The use
of the a ss ign men t  and q u it cla im  de ed  may s tem  from the
lender’s un cert ain ty a bout  th e na tu re  of the  pu rch as er ’s r ight s.
Are they  pr imar ily con t ractua l? Should the  purchaser  instead
be tr eat ed as ownin g an equ ity of redem ption? In a ny event ,
t he re is n o rea son wh y, if the ju ris diction p erm its  power  of sale
foreclos u re , that  a deed of trust or mortgage with power of sale
shou ld not  be used , jus t  a s  is  the case in  the n ormal secon d
mor tgage  lending con text .
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186. S ee Credit  Fi na nce , In c. v. B at em an , 66 0 P .2d  869  (Ari z. C t.  App . 19 83);
Fincher  v. Miles Homes, Inc.,  549 S.W.2d 848 (Mo. 1977); Yu v. Paperchase
Par tnership,  845 P.2 d 158 (N.M . 1992). But see Es ta t e o f Brewer  v.  Io t a  De lt a
Chapte r , Tau  Kapp a E psilon F ra ter nit y, Inc., 692 P .2d 597 (Or. 1984 ) (explainin g
ven dor  not obligated to pr ovide not ice to th e pur chas er’s mort gagee eve n t hough
ven dor  act ua lly k no ws  of m ortgagee’s e xis te nce ) superseded by  OR . RE V. STAT . §
93.935-.945 (199 7).
187. S ee St an ar d v. M ar boe, 1 98 N .W. 12 7 (Min n. 1 924); see also Note , Mortgages
— Notice — Vendor and Purchaser — Vend or Not Charged W ith  Con st ru ctiv e N otice
of S ub sequ ent  Mor tga ge of C ont ract  Pu rch aser ’s E qu ity  — M ort gag ee R equ ired  to
Notify  Vendor to Protect Security Interest, 45 WA S H . L. RE V. 645 , 64 6 (19 70).
188. S ee Shindledecker  v. Savage, 627 P.2d 1241 (N.M. 1981); Dirks  v. Cornwe ll,
754 P. 2d  946  (Ut ah  Ct . App . 19 88); K en dr ick  v. D av is,  452  P. 2d  222  (Wa sh . 19 69).
189. This  app roa ch is cr iticized in  Thom as A. H enzle r, N ote, Mortgages–Mortgage
of a V end ees In ter est in an  In sta llm ent  La nd  Con tra ct–M ortg agee’s Ri gh ts U pon
Default: Fincher  v. Miles Homes of Missouri, In c., 43 Mo. L. Rev. 371, 373-74 (1 978 ).
The fact  tha t  t he  pu rchaser ’s inter est is m ortgagea ble raises
a  more  fundamenta l  is sue than sim ply its  docum ent at ion. Wha t
a re the  mor tgagee’s  r ight s  in  t he event th e vendor declares a
forfeitur e? Gen er ally cases hold tha t  a  vendor  who has  actua l
kn owledge  of t he  pu rchaser ’s m ort gagee ma y not declare a
forfeitu re  of the  con t ract  withou t  p rov id ing  the purchaser’s
mort gagee with  not ification of th e in t e n t  to forfeit  an d a n
oppor tun ity to pr otect it self.186 There  is  some  au thorit y tha t
even where  the vendor  lacks actua l knowle dge of t he
mort gagee’s existence, if t he m or tga ge i s r ecor de d t he ve ndor  is
deemed  to h a ve const ru ctive notice of the m ortgagee’s
existen ce.1 8 7  Th is  la t t er  app roach  im pos es  a  du ty on  the ve ndor
to exam ine t itle t o th e lan d pr ior t o a forfeitu re d eclar at ion in
order to en su re t ha t  not ice i s g iven  to any m or tga gee  of the
purchaser ’s int ere st . However , th ere  is also significan t ca se la w
holding th at , absen t a ctua l knowledge of th e mort gagee’s
exi st en ce, t he ve ndor  is  not  oblig a ted  to not ify th e mort gagee of
the pendin g forfeitur e.188 Th es e ca se s r ely  on the n ot ion  tha t
record ing ope ra tes  as n ot ice on ly  to those acqu ir ing  an  in t e res t
in  the land subsequen t to the recording and not to those whose
interest  pr eda ted  it. As a  pr act ical mat te r , in  ju r i sd ict ions
adopt ing th is r ea sonin g, a  m or tga gee  de si r in g protect ion  must
give the  vendor  actua l  not ice  of the exist en ce of the m ort gage  a t
the time t he m ortgagee  t akes  it , a  requ ir em en t  tha t  is  not
cu r ren tly im pos ed  on most  jun ior  mor t gagee s in  the t r adi t ion a l
mor tga ge law  set tin g.189
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190. S ee Note , supra  note 187, at  646.
191. S ee supra  note s 129-34 an d accompa nyin g text .
192. S ee RE A L E S T AT E  F I N AN C E  LAW , supra  note 1, § 7.12.
193. S ee i d . § 7.19.
194. S ee RE S T AT E M E N T, supra  no te 2 , §  6.4 cmt . a .
195. S ee i d . § 7.1 cmt. b.
196. S ee supra  Pa rt  VI.C. 
Suppose a pu rcha ser’s mort gagee receives notice of a
ven dor ’s int ent  to invok e forfeitu re. Wh at  a r e its r ights? Ther e
has been some sugges t ion  tha t  not i fi ca t ion  permi t s the
mort gagee to fu l fi ll  t he  pu rchaser ’s obligation u nder  th e
con t r act .190 What does this  mean? I f i t  means  tha t  the
mort gagee ma y tak e over the p u r chase r ’s in ter es t  wit hout
foreclos ure of th e mort gage, it  clear ly is wr ong becau se it  would
confer  on  the  pu rchaser ’s  mor tga g ee  grea ter  r igh t s  than
possessed  by a second mort gagee in th e normal  mor tgage
conte xt.
Und er  th e R estat em ent a  s t r a ight  mor tgage an alogy would
be ap plied  in t he  foregoing s itu at ion. F i rs t , of cour se, forfeitu re
wou l d be impermissible—the vendor would be required to
foreclos e th e cont ra ct as a  mort gage.191 If t h e foreclosur e is
judicia l, the purch as er ’s m ort gagee  mu st  be m ad e a  pa rt y-
defendan t .192  If power  of sale foreclosur e is per mis sible in  th e
ju r isdict ion , th e pur chaser ’s mort gagee would norm ally be
ent itled to ma iled notice of the foreclosure. 193 What  then  a re  the
mort gagee’s rights? It would be treated as a  jun ior  mor tga gee in
a  t r ad it iona l “sen ior  mor tgage-jun ior  mor tgage” set t ing.  In  th i s
conte xt,  when t he s en ior  mor tga ge i s in  de fau lt , t he ju n ior
mort gagee has  two op t ions . F ir s t , it  may pa y off or  “redeem” the
sen ior  mortgage and stand in th e senior’s shoes as an assigne e
of tha t  mor tgage .194 I f th i s op t ion  i s t aken , the second  mor tga ge
would  then own two mortgages on the land a nd mu s t  foreclos e
one or both  of them  to a cquir e eit her  mon ey or t itle t o th e lan d.
Alter na tive ly, the second  mor tga gee m ay fore close its  mor tga ge
a n d th e pu rch as er a t t ha t s ale w ould a cquir e tit le to t he la nd
subject to the  fi r st  mor tgage.1 95 Second m ort gagee w ould
acqu ire tit le only if it  actu ally pur chases a t t he foreclosur e sale.
Of cour se,  as  ind ica t ed ea r li er ,1 9 6  th e R estat em ent does  not
con templa te tha t  se lle r s of land w ill  cont i n ue  t o use con t r act s
for  de ed , a lbe it  su bject  to mor t g a ge  la w. Tha t will occur on ly if
a  ven dor  cont in ues  to use  the con t ract  for  deed after  his or her
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197. S ee RE A L E S T AT E  F I N AN C E  LAW , supra  note 1, at  343.
198. Id .
199. S ee U.C.C. § 9-105 (1)(i) (1997) (“instr um ent ” mean s “a negotia ble
in s t rumen t . . . or an y other writin g which evidences a right to the pa yment of
money an d is  no t i ts elf a  se cur it y a gr ee me nt  or  lea se  an d is  of a t ype wh ich is in
ju r isdict ion  adopts  th e R estat em ent approach .  Ra ther , the
R estat em ent’s u lt imate  pu rpose i s t o r emove an y incentive for
ven dor s to use t h e  con t ract  for  deed and  thus  to ensure  tha t
t rad it iona l mor tga ge inst rumen ts a re u se d in  la nd finance
t r a n sactions. I f tha t  occurs , the  cur ren t  uncer ta in t i es  tha t
p lague secured  lendin g to cont ra ct for deed p ur chaser s will be
eliminated.  The rights of the part ies will be mor e clear ly
define d a nd  pr edicta ble an d t his  sh ould u ltim at ely enhance  the
ava ilab ility of jun ior m ort gage fin an cing.
2. Mortgaging vendor’s interest
 In  order  to unders tand a de qu a t ely  t he u se  of a  ven dor ’s
con t ract  for deed in ter est a s secu r ity for a  loan, w e mu st  first
focus on  how a  secu r ity  in t ere st  is obta ined  in it s economic
equ iva len t—a promissory  not e  secured by a m ortgage. Pledges
of notes  se cured  by m or tga ges  occur  in  a  va r iet y of cont ext s. A
se lle r  of rea l es ta te s omet im es  takes  ba ck from the  pu rchaser  a
purchase mon ey not e an d m ort gage for pa rt  of the s ale  price.
Lat er  seller ma y need to borrow money a nd m ay pledge th e
note and  mor tgage  a s s ecu r ity  for  t ha t  loan. S imila rly, a
financia l i ns t it u t ion  such  a s  a  bank  or  t h r ift  i ns t it u t ion  holding
mor tgage loans in port folio ma y sometimes  pledge them  as
secu r ity for  repayment  for  loans  made to i t  by  other
inst i tu t ions .
At  this  point  Art icle 9 of the Uniform Com mer cia l Cod e
en ter s th e pictur e. It is widely accepted th at  promiss ory notes
and the  mor tgages  secur ing t h e m  are  pe rsona l  proper ty  and
tha t  pledges of th em a re governed  by Article 9.197 What  does
th i s mean? With r espect to a pledgee’s rights in a prom issory
note, th e an s we r  is clear—“th e pledgee mus t follow Art icle 9’s
procedures  in order  t o perfect h is  or  he r  r ight s as a gainst  other
claim an t s t o t he n ote, su ch a s t he p ledgor’s t ru st ee in
ba nk ru pt cy or subsequ ent  good faith  pur chaser s or ass ignees of
the pled gor .”198 F i r st ,  note  tha t  a  promissory  note  is  an
“inst rumen t” for purposes of th e Code.199 As  an  in s t rumen t ,
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ordina ry course of bus iness  tr an sferr ed by deliv ery with  any  necessa ry indor semen t
or  as sig nm en t. ”).
200. S ee U.C.C. § 9-304(1) (1997); Rodney v. Arizona Bank, 836 P.2d 434  (Ari z.
C t . App. 1992 ); In re Len dve st  Mor tga ge, 1 19 B. R. 19 9 (B.A.P . 9t h C ir . 199 0); In  re
Nichols, 88 B.R. 871 (Bankr. D. Ill. 1988). Interestingly, under  revisions to Article 9
cu r ren t ly un der cons ide r a t i on ,  a  len der  to a  mor tg ag ee w ill b e a ble  to p er fect  a
secu r i ty in t ere s t  in  a  promissory note by filing a financing st atem ent a s well as by
tak ing posses sion of it. S ee U. C.C . §§ 9-3 10,  311  (Pr opos ed  Dr aft  199 7).
201. S ee U. C.C . § 9-1 02 cm t.  4 (19 97):
This  Article is not applicable to the creat ion of the r eal estat e
mortgage.  . . . However, when th e m ortga gee pledges  th e not e to secu re h is
own obligation t o X, this Art icle applies  to th e secur ity in t e re st  t hus
created, wh ich is a s ecur ity int eres t in  an  inst ru men t even  th ough t he
inst rumen t is secured by a real est ate m ortgage. This Art icle leaves to other
law th e ques tion of th e effect on righ ts u nder  th e mor tga ge of delivery  or
non-de live ry of the mort gage or of recordin g  or  n on- record ing of an
ass ignmen t  of the mortgagee’s interest.
Id .
202. S ee GR A N T GILMORE , SEC UR ITY IN T E R E S TS  I N  P ERSONAL P ROPERTY  311  (196 5);
Comment, An  Article Nine S cope Problem — Mortgages, Leases, and Rents as
Collateral, 47 U. C OLO . L. RE V. 449 , 45 6-57  (197 6).
203. S ee In re Ma ry ville  Sa v. & L oan  Cor p., 7 43 F .2d 4 13 (6t h C ir . 198 4); I n  R e
Ivy Pr ope rt ies , 10 9 B. R. 1 0 (Ba nk r.  D. M as s. 1 989 ).
204. S ee, e.g., Bow mar ,  R ea l E st at e In teres ts a s S ecu ri ty U nder  the U CC : T he
Scope of Arti cle Nin e, 12 U CC L .J . 99, 1 21 (19 79); J an Z. Kra snowie cki et  al., The
Kennedy Mortgage Co. Bank ruptcy Case: N ew L igh t S hed  on t he P osit ion  of
Warehous ing Ban ks, 56 AM . BANKR. L.J . 325  (198 2).
205. S ee, e.g., Greiner  v. Wilke, 6 25 F .2d  281  (9t h C ir . 198 0); St ar r v . Br uce
Far ley Corp., 612 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1980); Ja ckson County F ed. Sav.  & Loan Ass’n
per fection of a  securit y inter est in  th e note can be a ccomplished
by i t s t r ans fe r  t o t he pledgee.200 However, as t o the m ortgage,
ther e is some ambiguity, but increasingly less so. The Code
does not  dea l specifically w ith  whether  the pledgee must  take
some fu r the r act ion  to per fect r ights in  th e mort gage or
whet her  per fection of a secur ity int erest  in th e note will suffice.
There is some suggest ion in th e Officia l Comment  tha t  th is
que st ion is to be resolved by non-Code law r a t h e r  t h an  by the
Code it se lf, 201 and  some  commenta tor s202  and a  few cases  take
th i s pos it ion .203 To the  ex ten t  t ha t  t h is  la t t e r  vi ew pre vails , a
secur ity in ter est  in t he  mortgage must  be perfected under st ate
recording act principles.
The bett er view, a nd  th e one t ha t is  receivin g growin g
acceptan ce, is th at  th e mort gage simply follows the n ote an d
the refore that  a perfected secur ity  int e res t  in  t he  note
encompass es the mortgage as well.  This appr oa ch  is endors ed
by mos t  commenta tor s204 and recent cases.205 I t  fi nds  suppor t
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 3\ F I N A L \ N E L - F I N .W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
1160 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1998
v. Maduff Mortgage Corp., 608 F. Supp. 588 (D. Colo. 1985); First Nat ’l Ban k v.
La r son , 17 B.R. 957, 965  (B a nkr . D. N .J . 198 2); see also 4 J A M E S J . WH I T E  & ROBERT
S. SUMMERS , UN I F O R M  COMMERCIAL CODE  47 (4th e d. 1995) (“Court s gene ra lly . . .
conclude tha t  Ar t icle 9 g overns per fection of a security int erest in t he note a nd
conclude tha t  no ac tion need be ta ken  with  rega rd t o the  mort gage, n or an y filing
done in  th e r ea l es ta te  re cor ds .”).
206. S ee In re Staff Mortgage & In v. Corp., 550 F.2d  1228 (9t h Cir . 1977); A.E.
Penn ebaker  Co. v . F ul ler , 69 1 F . Su pp . 93 8 (W.D. N.C. 1988); In re Kennedy
Mortga ge Co., 17 B.R. 957 (Bank r. D. N.J . 1982); Army Na t ’l  Bank  v . Equ ity
Developers, In c., 7 74 P .2d  919  (Ka n.  198 9).
207. S ee RE A L E S T AT E  F I N AN C E  LAW , supra note 1, at  345.
208. S ee, e.g., Cain & Bultman, Inc. v. Miss Sam, Inc., 409 So. 2d  114 (F la .  Di st .
C t . App. 1982); Erickson v. First  Nat ’l Bank, 697 P.2d 1332 (Mont. 1985); Fin ch v.
Benef ic ia l N.M ., In c., 905  P.2 d 19 8 (N. M. 19 95); In re F reeborn , 617  P .2d  424 (Wash .
198 0).
209. S ee RE A L E S T AT E  F I N AN C E  LAW , supra note 1, at  116.
210. S ee i d .
211. S ee id .
either  i n t he  a r gumen t  tha t  the Code  im pl icit ly endor se s i t  or
by th e as ser tion  th at  it  flows  na tu ra lly from the  common law
doct r ine th at  th e mort gage au t om a t ically follows the n ote.206 It
avoids  the  necess ity of mu ltip le pr ecau tion s su ch a s r ecordin g a
mor tgage ass ignment  in  the rea l es ta te r ecor ds  or  the fil in g of a
fina ncin g s t a t emen t  t o p rot ect  t h e pledgee again st oth er
creditors. The  tr an sfer of posses sion of the n ote affords  a s imp le
and effici en t  mech anism for  p er fecting a security interest
simultaneously in both document s.207
On th e other  ha nd , th e len der  wh o desir es effective  secu r ity
in  a contr act for deed vendor ’s  in te res t  confron t s  confus ion  and
inefficiency. Wh ile  it  is  un ive rsa lly  accep ted  tha t  a  ven dor ’s
con t ract  for deed in ter est is m ortgagea ble,208 t h i s un iversa l
consensus quickly unr avels once we focus on t he m echan ics of
mor tgaging th i s in teres t . Traditiona l ly , many  lenders  who lend
money on th e securit y of th e vendor’s cont ra ct in te re st  ha ve
t r ea t ed th e t ra nsa ction as if the vend or were m ortgaging a  fee
sim ple interest in the land. 209 They ass um e th at  because t he
ven dor  holds legal title t o the lan d described in  the con t ract ,  the
vendor  is its “real” owner. 210 As  a  resu lt ,  a  lender  opera t ing on
th i s assumption takes a t ra dit iona l mor tga ge an d r ecords it  in
the real estate records.211 Su ch  a  pr act ice p res umably  pr otect s
t h e lender ’s priorit y agains t both  un secured a nd su bsequen t
lien credit or s  of t he  vendor . Indeed , many cour t s  con t inue  to
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212. S ee, e.g., In re Shus t er , 7 84  F .2d 8 83 (8t h C ir . 198 6); In re Hoeppner , 49
B.R. 124  (Ba nk r.  E. D. W is.  198 5); An th on y v. R ea rd on , 83 5 P .2d  811  (N. M. 1 992 ).
213. 617 P. 2d  424  (Wa sh . 19 80).
214. S ee supra  note s 200-201 an d accompa nyin g text .
215. U.C.C. § 9-10 2(3) cm t.  4 (19 97).
216. Freeborn, 617 P.2d at  428.
adhere to t he p osition t ha t t he foregoin g met hod is  th e only
acceptable method for mortgaging the vendor’s interest.212
Oth er  decision s, h owever , reject  th e foregoing a pproach  in
favor  of applying Art icle 9 of th e Uni form  Com m ercial Code. In
a  lea din g case , In re Freeborn,213  t he  Wash ington  Supreme
Cou r t  held t ha t a  lender  could obta in  a  perfect ed se cur ity
interest  i n t he vendor’s right  to receive the contra ct paym ent s
only by com plyin g wi th  Art icle  9, w hich  the cou r t  held tr eat ed
th i s pa ym en t  st r ea m as a  “gen er a l in tangib le. ” The cou r t
rea soned tha t  the ve ndor  has both  lega l t it le t o the la nd (w hich
is r ea lty ) and the r igh t  to rece ive  the con t ract  pa ym en ts (w hich
is per son a lt y). Thus,  wh ile  t akin g a nd r ecor ding a  mor tga ge or
sim ilar  docum ent s in  th e rea l esta te r ecords  protects t he lend er
against  su bsequ ent  claims  to t he ven dor’s lega l tit le, it  does  not
protect  the le nde r  aga in st  su bs equen t  claims on  the ve ndor ’s
righ t  to rece ive  cont ract  paymen ts. Consequ ent ly, becau se th e
secu r ity int ere st s in  Freeborn  had  on ly been  recorded  in  the
real estate records, they were deemed unperfected.
Im port an tly,  th e Freeborn a n a l ysis u tilize s a  st ra ight
mor tgage t ransact ion  ana logy.  The  cour t cit ed the  Officia l
Com ment to sect ion 9-102(3), cons ider ed ea rlier  in t his
sect ion ,214 which st at es tha t  alth ough Article 9 is inapplicable to
the crea t ion  of a  rea l e sta te  m or t gage i t se lf,  “when  the
mor tgagee pl ed ges the n ot e t o secu re h is  own  obl iga t ion  to X,
th i s Article applies to the security interest  t h us crea ted , which
is a s ecur ity in teres t  in  an  ins t rument  even  though  the
inst rument is  secu re d by a  re al e st at e m ort gage.”215 Accordin g
to the  cour t ,  the s itua t ion  descr ibe d in  the com men t—the
pled ge by a  mor tgage e to secu re h is own obliga tion  to a  th ird
par ty—was ana logous  to the  case i t  confront ed. “Here,  the
ven dor  an d h older  of legal t itle  as sign ed t he  righ t t o receive real
e st a t e con t ract  payments  in  order  to secure his  obliga t ion  to a
th ird  pa r ty. ”216
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217. S ee Heid e v. Ma ding King Count y Ent ers., 915 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1990)
( st a t ing bot h r ea lty  an d Cod e filin g n eces sa ry ); In re Equit able Dev. Corp., 617 F.2d
1152 (5th  Cir . 198 0) (find ing  Code  filin g n eces sa ry ); In re Gold Key P roper ties , I n c.,
119 B.R. 787 (Bankr. D. Or. 1990) (explaining both realt y and Code filing ne ces sa ry );
In  re Nort her n Acres , Inc., 52 B .R. 641 (Ban kr . D. Mich. 1985); S.O.A.W. Ent ers . v.
Cast le Rock Indus. Ban k, 32 B.R. 279 (Bank r. D. Te x. 1983) (finding Code filing
su fficie nt ); In re Sou th wor th , 22  B.R . 37 6 (Ba nk r.  D. K an . 19 82) (finding  both  r ea lty
and Code filing necessar y); Security Ba nk v. Chia puzio, 747 P.2d 335 (Or. 1987)
( st a t ing eit he r t ype  of filin g su fficie nt ).
218. S ee S .O.A .W.  En ter s. , 32 B.R. at  279 (finding Code filing su fficie nt );
Chiapuz io, 747  P. 2d  at  335  (st at in g ei th er  ty pe  of filin g su fficie nt ).
219. RE A L E S T AT E  F I N AN C E  LAW , supra  note 1, at  119.
220. Id .
The foregoing approach has b e en  adopted by severa l other
court s.217 However, even th ough th ese decisions hold that
Art icle 9 is a pplica ble t o per fectin g a s ecur ity in t e r es t  in  a
ven dor ’s inter est, t hey disa gree as  to th e procedur e to be
followed. In re Freeborn  it se lf r equ ir es  the ve ndor ’s len de r  bot h
to perfect his or her mortgage as a chat tel security interest
un der  Article 9 and to recor d it  in t he  rea l  es ta te  records ; the
l a tt e r st ep  pr es umably  is  necess a ry in  orde r  for  the lender  t o
acqu ir e a p er fected  righ t  to seize  and a ss er t  the ve ndor ’s
interest  in  the rea l e sta te . On  the ot h e r  h and , other  deci sions
hold tha t  per fect ion  under  Art icle 9 a lone  is  su ffi ci en t .218 The
Freeborn “two-fold” requirement ha s been criticized on the
ground tha t  “[n]o policy is  se rved  by for cin g ever yon e t o use
bot h  belt  an d su spe nd er s. [Fr eebor n] . . . sh ou l d sim ply h ave
ca r r ied th e mor tga ge law a na logy to it s logica l con clu sion  and
he ld t he  [UCC] filing s ufficient  for complet e per fection.”219
Note the d ile mma for  a  len de r  to a  ve n dor  i n  a ju r isdict ion
wher e th e law  ha s n ot been  clar ified. Those w ho t ak e secu rit y
interests  i n a  con t r act  vendor ’s  r ight s  “a re  we ll  advi sed to
recor d some  appropria te in stru ment .  .  .  in the r eal estate
records, an d to file a finan cing stat emen t a s well. The added
expense an d in convenien ce . . . seem a  sm all  p r ice  to pay for  the
enh an ced protect ion  t he vendor’s creditor will get as against
th ird  pa rt y claim an ts .”220
Will adoption of the R estat em ent ap pr oach im pr ove mat ters?
The commenta ry to the  R estat em ent s t a t es  t ha t  “[t]r ea tmen t  of
the con t r act  for  deed a s  a  mor tgage  wi ll  cl a ri fy  tha t  Ar t icle 9 of
the Un iform Commercia l Cod e gover ns t he a cqu is it ion  and
per fect ion  of a securit y interest  in a vendor’s position. This will
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221. RE S T AT E M E N T, supra  note 2, § 3.4, cmt d.
222. See U.C.C. § 9-105(i) (1997), which defines an “instrum ent” a s a p ap er  “of
a  type which is in the ordina ry course of bus ines s t r ans fe r r ed by de live ry with  any
necessa ry indor sem ent  or as signm ent .” In re Holiday Int ervals, In c., 931 F.2d 500 (8th
Cir . 1991 ) (hold ing  contracts  for dee d a re  not  ins tr um en ts ); see also REAL E STATE
F INANCE  LAW , supra  note 1, at  118.
223. S ee U. C.C . § 9-1 06 (1 997 ); U.C.C. § 9-304 cm t. 1 (1997); White & Summer s,
su pra no te  205 , a t 5 0 (“The  cour t s gene ra lly ag ree  tha t  t he se ll er ’s  in t e re st  unde r  a
l and sa le con t r act is a ge ner al int an gible sub ject to Art icle 9. ‘Secur ity int eres ts in
genera l int an gibles ma y be per fected by filing a financing st atem ent, bu t not by
posses sion.’ ”); see also, e.g., In  re Ho lid ay  In te rv al s, I nc. , 93 1 F .2d  500  (8t h C ir . 19 91).
A secur ity int eres t in  a “gener al int an gible” is perfected on ly by filing a fina ncing
s t a t emen t . 
224. S ee Holiday Intervals , 931 F.2d at 505 (“We therefore hold tha t un der
Missour i la w, a  docu me nt  cont ai ni ng  bot h a  la nd  sa le in st al lm en t con t r a c t  a nd a
p romisso ry note should be considered as one document, and th at  s u ch  a docum ent  is
the re fo re not an  instr ume nt, t he . . . failure to file a U.C.C. financing s t a t emen t
leaves [t he]  sec ur it y i n ter es t  unpe r fect ed .”)
elimina te the u ncer ta in ty a nd r isk  ass ocia ted  wit h  se cured
lend ing to a  vend or.”221 Note th at  even th ough Article 9 will be
ap plicable  to a  secur i ty in terest in a vendor’s contr act rights,
th i s does not mea n t ha t its  increas ingly accepted m eth od of
sim ult an eously  perfecting a secur ity int erest  in a n ote an d
mor tgage—the t r a nsfer of possession of th e note t o the secur ed
pa rt y—will be the  appropr ia t e  means of per fect ion .  For  one
th ing, a  p romissory  note  nor m a l ly i s not  con ta ined  in  the
con t ract  for deed nor is one com m only found  a s a  s epa ra t e
document in  the t r ansact ion . More  impor t an t , t he  con t r act  for
deed i s p robably not  a n  “ins t rument” as  the UCC uses  tha t
t e rm.222 Rat her , it is corr ectly under stood to be a “genera l
inta ngible” for  pu rposes  of t he  Code and  a  secu r ity int ere st  in it
must  be pe rfect ed by t he  filing of a fina ncin g sta tem en t .223
Moreover , th is will probably be the case even  wher e the
con t r act  for  deed con ta ins  a  promissory  note .224
One may  va l id ly  a rgue  tha t  r equ ir ing two separa te means of
Art icle 9  pe r fect ion  for  in teres t s tha t  ar e economically, if not  in
form, ident ical repres ent s at  most a  minor im provemen t over
the st at us  quo. Again ,  it  is  wor th  emphas iz ing  tha t  adop t ion  of
the R estat em ent ap pr oach is n ot a imed  ult ima tely a t m ak ing
the contr act for deed a  more log ica l or efficient  financing device,
bu t ra the r  a t eliminating its ra ison  d’etr e. In  th e la st  an alys is, a
r a t iona l lan d fina ncin g syst em  sh ould in clude  a s ingle lan d
secur ity device—th e pr omiss ory not e an d m ort gage. Wh en t his
occurs,  delivery of the prom i ssory note will be the efficient a nd
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 3\ F I N A L \ N E L - F I N .W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
1164 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1998
225. S ee supra  Part  III.
226. S ee supra Par t IV.C.
227. S ee supra  Pa r t  V.
228. S ee supra  no t e 20 and  accompanying t ext .
229. S ee supra  Par t VII.A-B.
230. S ee supra  Par t VII.C.
231. S ee supra Par t VII.D.
232. S ee supra  Par t  VII .E .
only mechanism for  perfect ing a  secur ity in ter est  in a  lan d
seller’s rights.
VIII. A F I N A L  AS S E S S ME N T
 This  a r t icl e demons t r a t es  t hat , wit h t he p ossible exce pt ion
of th ose st at es t ha t h ave in st itu tion alized  forfeitu r e ,2 25 t he
con t ract  for deed is a n u npr edictable an d  u n reliable  fina ncin g
de vice  from th e persp ective of th e vendor an d pur chaser  alike.
We have seen  that  court s  increas ingly use a va riety of devices
to lim it  th e ava ilabilit y an d h ar sh ne ss of th e forfeit ur e r em edy.
Cour t s an d legis lat ur es a re  incr ea sin gly ap plyin g a  m or tgage
law  ana logy i n  ass es sing t he r igh t s of con t ract  p a rties. 226
Moreover , this  sam e uncert aint y confronts th e vendor who
seeks specific performa nce or other nonforfeitur e remedies.227
On the  other han d, forfeitu res  ar e some tim es en forced aga ins t
pu rchaser s with  subs tan t ia l equ i ty in  the rea l estate—the tar dy
pur chaser  can  neve r  be  complet ely  cer ta in  wh en  the t en de r  of
ar rea ra ges or th e cont ra ct balan ce will forest all forfeitur e.228 In
add it ion , t it le p roble ms a bou nd for  the ve ndor  and pu rcha ser
alike. 229  Also, se r iou s ques t ion s con cer n in g t he n a ture of t he
con t ract  for  de ed  bede vil  ba nkrupt cy cou r t s.230 Equ ally
impor t an t , con t r act  for  de ed  use  pos es  su bs tan t ia l proble ms for
th ird par ties. Th e r ight s  of judgment  credi tor s  of the  con t ract
par ties  a re  often  ambiguous  and un pr edicta ble an d t his
sit ua tion  is  somet imes  ma de m ore complica ted  by judicia l
in voca t ion  of equ it able  conver sion  or  simila r  ana lyt ica l
abstra ctions.2 31 More important, potential secured lenders to
either  the  vend or or pu rch as er fa ce subs ta nt ial u ncer ta int y
about  th e pr iorit y of th eir s ecur ity in ter est s a nd  th eir  r ights in
the even t  t he  ma in  con t r act  goes into defau lt .232 This
sign ificant ly imped es th e ma rk eta bility of th eir s ecur ity
in te res t s  on  the  seconda ry market .
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233. S ee RE A L E S T AT E  F I N AN C E  LAW , supra  note 1, at  581.
234. S ee, e.g., id. at  69; Cha rles  F. Becke r , Comment , R em edy in g th e In equ iti es
of Forfeitu re in L and  Ins tallm ent Con tracts , 64 IOWA L. RE V. 158  (197 8).
235. S ee generally, RE A L E S T AT E  F I N AN C E  LAW , supra  note 1, § 8.4.
236. S ee id . at 108.
237. S ee i d .
Since relat ively few of th e foregoing pr oblems  exist  in a  lan d
fina ncin g sys tem tha t  uses only mortgages or deeds of trust,
one is compelled t o ask wh y the contr act for deed con t inues to
find acceptance among land s eller s.  Se ver a l explana t ion s
suggest th ems elves. In  a s izeable , albeit  decreasing,  number  of
stat es, mort gages mu st be foreclosed by  a cos t ly  and  t ime-
consuming judicia l a ct ion .233 Th is  hel ps  t o expla in w hy t he
con t ract  for  deed  is  pop ula r  in  ju r isdict ion s such  as Iowa , where
a  judicia l pr oceeding is  th e only foreclosu re  re me dy.234 But  why
is the  con t ract  for  deed con t inu ing  to be used  in  the  increas ing
major i ty of s t a t es  t ha t  now au thor i ze  power  of s a le  foreclosu re
of mortgages and deeds of trust? In some, m ortgage law,
notwiths tand ing the a va ila bil it y of n onjudicia l for eclos u r e, is
viewed by land seller s as bein g in other  res pects t oo prote ctive
of mort gagors. This m ay in fact be t he ca s e,  for  exam ple, in
those power of sa le  st a tes  tha t  a fford  the mor tgagor  long
postforeclosure redemption rights.235
But  how does  one  exp la in  the con t in ued  use  of th e con t ract
for  de ed  in  st a tes  wh er e p ower  of sa le foreclosur e is r elat ively
ine xpen sive and efficient a nd  wh er e post sa le r edem pt ion r ight s
and other  “pr o-mor tga gor ” pr ovis ion s ar e minimal? Sta tes  like
Missour i an d Ut ah  fall int o th is cat egory. Sever al exp lan a t ion s
a r e perh aps  plau sible. First , in some inst an ces ther e m ay
simply be informa tion failure. Th is ma y be the case in  border
a reas where contr acts for deed may “sp ill  over ” from
jur i sd ict ions wh er e m or tga ge l aw “t ilt s” in  favor  of mor tga gor s
(and th eir  use  may t her efor e in  som e m ea su re be  sensible ) to
ad jacen t sta tes wh ere t heir u se is d ifficu lt  to unde rst and or
may even be dangerous for vendors.236 Second , many vendors
may use con t r act s for  deed in low down payment sett ings and
take their  chances  tha t  their  pu rchase rs w ill  be  too
un sophisticat ed to recor d or  otherwise protect th eir interests.237
Sta ted  another way, vendors may  take the  chance  tha t  the
purchaser  will believe that  the contr act means wha t it  says.
Indeed, wha t  Professor  War ren  a sser ted se ver al d ecad es a go
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238. War ren , supra  note 155, at  633.
239. S ee RE S T A T E M EN T , supra  not e 2, § 7 .2; RE A L E S T AT E  F I N AN C E  LAW , supra
no te 1, § 9.1.
may st ill  be  the ca se : “[T]he ve ndor  cont i n u es  to use the
[con t ract  for  de ed ] . . . b eca use he is  willing to gam ble tha t t he
vendee’s righ ts  un der  th is device will never be as ser ted  an d h is
own  con t ractua l  advan tages will not  be cha llen ged.”238 Third,
some vendors ma y simply want  t he p sychologica l a ss urance
th at  th ey will regain  th eir lan d back in t he event  th e pur chaser
defaults.  I  have  somet imes hea rd anecd ota l ev iden ce fr om rura l
lawyers  th at  sellers of farm la nd, especially, want  th e “secu rit y”
of knowin g t ha t  they a re r et a in in g “ti t le” u n t il t he con t ract  is
pa id off. Wit h  a  mor t g ag e or  deed of tr us t, of cours e, th e
mort gagee will rega in t he la n d  on l y if he or she outbids
poten t ia l th ird pa rt y pur chaser s at  a pu blic foreclosure sa le.
However , given  the u ncer ta in ty a s t o the enforcea bil it y of
forfeitu re  clauses in these jurisdictions and th e other
subs tan t ia l pr oblems  as sociated with  the  con t ract  for  deed,  the
prospect  of “ne ver  re ally giving u p” one’s  land  seems  an
especially dubious rea son for its  use.
Advocacy of the ju dicial a dopt ion of th e R estat em ent
approach  to con t r act s  for  deed cl ea r ly  shou ld not  be int e rpre t ed
as re ject ing the  idea  tha t  it is  socially ad van ta geous for t he la w
to provide a relatively quick and inexpensive m ech anism for  a
land se lle r  to rea lize on  his or her  se cur it y in  the even t  of
defau lt  by a pur chaser . The ava ilability  of such  a  p rocedure
pr obably encour ages  th e exte ns ion of cred it t o individu als
whose cred it -wor th in es s i s s o poor  t ha t ins titu tional or oth er
th ird pa r ty financing would be unava ilable. Indeed, the law h as
t radition ally encour aged  th e exte ns ion of cred it by t he la nd
sellers  in  other  con text s . For  e xa m ple,  under  the “purchase
money mortgage” doct r ine, the vendor and other pu rchase
money mor tga gees a re given  lien p rior ity  over other  liens or
in te res t s  pr evious ly ar isin g th rou gh t he pu rcha ser -
mor tgagor .239 Howeve r, t he solut ion to t his  nee d for sp ecial
incen tives  to lan d seller s sh ould not  be the  con t ract  for deed. In
most sta tes t his device has p roved to be unr eliable for  the
ven dor  and  purchas er  a like. In st ead , th e solut ion lies wit hin
the confin es  of t r adi t ion a l mor tga ge law. Th e first  st ep wou ld
be judicia l ad op t ion of the R estat em ent appr oach. Legislatur es
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240. F o r a plea that t he New Mexico legislatu re shou ld adop t  t he  Res t a t emen t
pos it i on , see P roven cio, supra note 20, at  300.
241. As of 1994 over 30 jurisdictions au thorized a nd us ed power o f sa le o r  simila r
types of nonju dicial foreclosu re. S ee RE A L E S T AT E  F IN AN C E  LAW , supra note 1, § 7.19
n.1.
242. S ee supra Par t III.
243. S ee MI N N . STAT . AN N . § 559.21(2a) (Wes t 1 990 ).
244. S ee id . § 580 .23 (1).
245. S ee supra Par t I.
may then  have t o act .240 In  th ose st at es t ha t cu rr ent ly per mit
only foreclosur e by jud icial a ction, le gisla tu re s sh ould a ut hor ize
power of sa le for eclos ure of m or t g a ges  and deeds  of t ru s t .241
Sta tes  th a t  a lr ea dy  have n onjudicia l for eclos ure le gis la t ion
should amend it t o provide special incentives for land  seller
fina ncin g. A dua l t r ack  foreclosu re process could per mit  quicker
foreclos ure of a  ven dor  pu rcha s e m oney mor tgage  where the
mor tgagor  ha s n ot sa tis fied a s pecified min i m um  per cen tage of
the original mort gage obliga t ion . Mor eove r , ot her  mor tga gor
protections could be modified. For example, in those states th at
a fford mor tgagors  a  st a t u t ory  redempt ion  per iod  a fte r  the
foreclosu re sa le, th at  red emp tion  righ t wou ld be u na vaila ble
unless th e r equ isit e per cent age  of the  mor tga ge obliga t ion  had
been satisfied.
The use of contr acts for deed in states th a t  h a ve
inst itut ionalized the for feit u re r em ed y by  st a tu te p ose  a  more
difficult  qu es t ion . In  thes e s t a tes , t he con t ract  for  deed
“works”—for fe itu re not  on ly i s en forced,  bu t  it  p r oduces a
marketa ble tit le in  th e ven dor r ela tive ly chea ply a nd
efficient ly.242 Why “mess  with  su ccess?” Why n ot lea ve well
en ough  a lon e? The Min nes ota  leg is la t ion ,243 espe cially, tr iggers
these quest ions. It works r elatively efficient ly. Forfeit u re is
enforced, but its har shness is  am eliora te d by givin g th e
pur chaser  a t hir ty- or sixt y-day pe riod a fter  not ice of de fau l t t o
pay arr earages and certain other costs. However ,  once
forfeitu re  occurs,  no p os t -forfeitur e redemption is permitted.
This  l at t e r  fea tu re makes  the s t a tut e  a t t ract ive  to sel le r s
because  a  six m onth  red em pt ion  pe r iod a pp lies t o power  of sa le
foreclos ure of mort gages.244 In deed , my fa mily h as experienced
bot h  side s of th e Min ne sota  contr act  for deed  syst em . Not  only,
as I  noted ea r li er ,245 wer e m y parent s purchasers of our first
house under  t h is s ys tem , m y fa ther  recen t ly was a  cont ract  for
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 3\ F I N A L \ N E L - F I N .W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
1168 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1998
246. The Resta t emen t recogn izes t his obviou s pr oposition . S ee RE S T A T E ME N T ,
supra  note 2, § 3.4 cmt. d (“[S]tatut es in several sta tes recognize  and  r egu la t e  t he
cont rac t for deed as a distinct mortga ge substitute a nd aut h o rize forfeiture as a
remedy  for p ur cha ser  br ea ch. T o th e ex te nt  th at  th is s ect ion  conflic t s w ith  such  a
s t a tu tory scheme, it will have no effect on the rights an d remedie s  of  t h e p a rt i es  t o
a  con tr act  for  de ed  tr an sa cti on .”).
deed vendor  of a  sm all h ouse  tha t  he h ad inher it ed  from m y
un cle.
While  i t  is  t rue tha t  the  Minnesota  sys tem and oth ers  like  it
work well with r espect to th e forfeitur e rem edy, the “th i rd
pa r ty” pr oble ms w it h  the con t ract  for  de ed  are ju st  as s er iou s
and per plexin g i n  t h ese st at es a s t he y ar e in s ta te s t ha t h ave
not  inst itut ionalized the forfeitur e process. The r igh t s  of t h ird
pa r ty creditors, secured an d unsecured, a re ju st  as p roble mat ic.
This  is  because  the con t ract  for dee d con cep tua lly  is  bot h  a
con t ract  and  financin g  device, “fish as well as  fowl.” These
p rob lems would be obviated  if a ll s t a tes , in clu ding Minnes ota ,
r e turn ed t o a u nit ar y lan d fina nce sys tem , with  mor tga ge law
and th e power  of s a le  mor tgage  or  deed of t ru s t  a s i t s
founda t ion . Of cou rse , in  st a tes  lik e Min nes ota  t h is process
cannot  begin with a  judicial adoption of th e R estat em ent
approach . Wh er e t he con t r a ct for deed is regulated by statut e
and aut h or izes forfeitur e, absent  const itut ional deficiencies,
cour t s may not  supp lan t  what  legislatu res have manda ted.246
Rather , th e an swer  in s uch  st at es lies in  th e legisla tu r e. In
Min nes ota , for  example , the  pa th  to a  u n itar y system  seems
rela tively  simple. F ir st , t he con t ract  for  de ed  ter min a t ion
s t a t ut e should be repealed. Its substan ce should be
incorpora t ed in to tha t  s t a te’s  power  of sa le  mor tgage
foreclos ure legislation. Thus , land seller s who ta ke back  a
purchase money mor tga ge would b e ab le to ob ta in  a  non jud icia l
foreclos ure sale subject to the same notice requirements an d
the sam e postdefau lt gra ce period  now mandated  under  the
cur ren t con t ract  for  deed  t ermina t ion  s ta tu te.  The  same
ar rea ra ges pr ovisions  would be  ap plicable. N o posts ale
red emp tion  would  be permi t t ed . Even  though  the cur ren t
con t ract  for deed le gislat ion does n ot dis tin guis h between
purchaser s who ha ve subs t a n t ia lly  red uced  the con t ract
ba lance an d th ose who have n ot ,  t h e new “mort gage law”
ver sion  sh ould m ak e t he  “fast  tr ack ” ava ilable on ly when  a
min imum specified percent age of th e m or tga ge obligat ion is
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unpaid. In  all  oth er s itu at ions, t he “norm al” power of sale
r equ i remen t s wou ld  be  t r igger ed , in clu ding t he cu r rent  six
mon th post-sale redemption period. The  only sign ificant  cha nge
from cur ren t  Minnesota  con t ract  for  deed p rocedure  would be
tha t  th e defa ult ing pu rch as er w ould h ave t he r ight  to a  pu blic
foreclos ure sa le of t he p rope r ty. This  pu bli c sa le a nd va lu a t ion
of the land cou l d i n  some in st ances  res u lt  in  a  su rplus for  the
purchaser -mor tgagor . The  vend or would  not  au tom at ically
rega in  the la nd via  for feit u re—h e or  she would be required to
pur chase a t t he sa le.
IX. CO N C L U S I O N
 The R estat em ent approach  to the con t ract  for  deed shou ld be
viewed as being neith er  “p ro-deb tor” nor  “p ro-credi tor .” Ra ther ,
it  rep res ent s a n a tt emp t t o inst ill ra tion alit y an d efficiency into
the na t ion ’s land financin g sys tem . Wh ile  toda y’s con t ract  for
deed can sometimes prove harsh  for  the  purchaser ,  it  i s an
equa lly pr oblema tic fina ncin g device for t he  vend or. In  m a ny
inst an ces it  works for  th e vendor simp ly becau se th e pur chaser
fails  to ass er t  h is  or  her  r igh t s.  It s u se  can  caus e  i n n umer able
t i t le pr oblems for  bot h  side s of t he tr an sa ction. Beca us e of its
ambiguous n a t u re an d un pred ictability, its use d iscour ages
secured  lending to both pur chasers and  vendors alike. These
problems, in  tu rn , h in de r  the d eve lopmen t  of a  sign ifica n t
seconda ry mar ket for th e sale of both vendors’ interests a nd
jun ior  mor tga ges  and s ecu r it y in ter es t s g iven  by con t ract
pur chaser s . It  clear ly is tim e for st at es t o ret ur n t o a un ita ry
system  of l and financing with in  the broad confin es of mor tga ge
law  and  procedure . One hopes  tha t th e R estat em ent will provide
a  major  impe tus in  tha t  d irect ion .
